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TAX ELECTIONS & PRIVATE BARGAINING
HeatherM Field
Focal points for private bargaining occur every instance the tax law
provides a tax election that directly affects multiple taxpayers. These
elections explicitly enable, and actually incentivize, the taxpayers to
cooperate in order to reduce their aggregate tax burden. For example,
divorced parents of a dependent child can negotiate about which parent
will be entitled to take the dependency exemption for the child. If the
parents work together, they can identify the parent for whom the
dependency exemption will have the most value. By electing to allocate the
dependency exemption to that parent, they can reduce their aggregate tax
burden and share in the tax savings. Yet transactioncosts, cognitive biases,
and sheer irrationality can impede taxpayers' abilities to bargain
effectively. Thus, in order to facilitate bargaining and reduce bargaining
costs, this article analyzes how impediments to negotiationshould affect the
design of two key election parameters: (1) the allocation, among the
affected taxpayers, of the power to make the election, and (2) the default
rule that will apply if no election is made. As examples, this article
examines tax bargainingfocal points in three settings where the negotiating
dynamic can differ significantly: divorce, employment, and corporate
acquisitions.In addition to making a few specific proposalsfor modifying
these elections, this articleprovides generalizablerecommendations about
how to design tax election parameters in order to facilitate effective and
efficient bargaining.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Consider Pam and Larry, the divorced parents of a little boy named
Sonny.I Pam and Larry share legal custody of Sonny, but Sonny resides
primarily with Pam.2 When Pam did her taxes last year, she took a
I The facts in this hypothetical example are based, very generally, on several cases in
which the Internal Revenue Service (Service) challenged a divorced parent's entitlement to
take a dependency exemption. See, e.g., Spanier v. Comm'r, 106 T.C. 1 (2004) (involving
Pamela and Lawrence Spanier and their three children).
2 I use stereotypical gender roles in this custody example, and throughout the article,
because these gender roles actually reflect the majority of situations. The most common
patterns for the allocation of custody of minor children in divorce are (1) sole-maternal
custody and (2) the pattern used in the example (joint legal custody and mother residential
custody). See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SUPPORT PROVIDERS: 2002, HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC
STUDIES 5 (2005); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND
THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2007 2-3 (2009) ("The legal custody arrangement specifies authority
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dependency exemption for Sonny.3 Pam was in the 10% marginal tax
6
bracket, so a $4000 dependency exemption was worth $400 to her.
Although Pam was entitled to the dependency exemption under the default
rules in the tax law, Pam and Larry could have agreed that Larry would
take the dependency exemption instead. Larry was in the 25% marginal tax
bracket, so the dependency exemption would have been worth $10007 to
him - $600 more than it was worth to Pam. Thus, if Pam and Larry had
negotiated about the allocation of the dependency exemption, they could
have shared that extra $600, making both of them better off Congress, in
the Internal Revenue Code, explicitly gave Pam and Larry an opportunity
to strike a private bargain that would reduce their aggregate tax burden,
and they did not take advantage of this chance.
In this situation and many others, 9 the tax law creates focal points for

to make educational, religious, and medical decisions for children. Residential [or physical]
arrangements indicated where children will primarily live."); Marjorie Lindner Gunnoe &
Sanford L. Braver, The Effects of Joint Legal Custody on Mothers, Fathers, and Children
Controllingfor Factors that Predispose a Sole Maternal versus Joint Legal Award, 25 L. &
HUM. BEHAv. 25, 26 (2001). Similarly, this article follows stereotypical gender roles in the
context of alimony as well because, again, this reflects the gender dynamic in most contexts
where alimony is awarded - alimony payments more commonly flow from the ex-husband
to the ex-wife than vice versa. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SUPPORT PROVIDERS: 2002,
HOUSEHOLD EcoNoMIC STUDIES 9 (2005).

3 1.R.C. § 151(c).
4 This is a stylized example that uses figures and rate brackets that allow for easy
computations. Also, this example focuses on federal income tax consequences, and it sets
aside state tax issues.
The dependency exemption for 2010 was actually $3650, but rounding up to $4000
allows for easier computation in the example. Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-45 I.R.B. 617
(stating the exemption amount for 2010).
6 $4000 * 10%= $400
' $4000*25%=$1000
8 Unless otherwise stated, all references herein to the "Code" or to a "section" refer to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
For another example, consider Ed and Irene, who divorced after 20 years of
marriage. See e.g., Richardson v. Comm'r, 125 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 1997) (providing, very
generally, the basis for this example). Ed, who was the primary breadwinner, paid alimony to
Irene. But, Irene did not realize that she would have to pay taxes on the alimony she
received, nor did she know that Ed would be able to take a deduction for the alimony he paid
to her. So, Irene did not take the tax cost into account when determining how much alimony
to ask for, and as a result, Irene's alimony provided her with much less after-tax income than
she anticipated. Irene was unable to take advantage of the opportunity to bargain with Ed
about the tax costs and benefits arising from the alimony arrangement. Ed did not
compensate her for any of the tax she had to pay on the alimony she received, and he was
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private negotiation.o These focal points occur every place the tax law
provides an explicit tax election I that directly affects the tax treatment of
multiple taxpayers.12 These elections, pursuant to which taxpayers can
merely tell the Internal Revenue Service (Service) how they would like to
be treated for tax purposes, increase the salience of opportunities for taxminimizing coordination among taxpayers.13 Yet transaction costs,
cognitive biases, and sheer irrationality can impede taxpayers' abilities to
able to keep the entire value of the tax deduction for alimony, without having to share that
benefit with Irene.
10 See Richard H. McAdams, Coordinating in the Shadow
of the Law: Two
Contextualized Tests of the FocalPoint Theory ofLegal Compliance, 42 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
865, 865-75 (2008) (arguing that "[i]n situations where people have an incentive to
coordinate their behavior," law can make a particular behavior salient, thereby influencing
and effectively endorsing coordination between individuals about that behavior). Clearly,
much of the tax law provides background rules that serve as a backdrop for private
negotiation between taxpayers. Sometimes the availability of this cooperative tax planning is
implicit in the law, as a result of the mere existence of different tax regimes. For example, an
investor and representatives of a business enterprise may negotiate about the terms of the
investor's economic investment in the business enterprise, knowing that the tax
consequences of debt investments differ from the tax consequences of equity investments. In
contrast, the focus of this article is the availability of cooperative tax planning that is
intentionally and explicitly provided in the tax law via explicit tax elections that directly
affect multiple taxpayers.
An explicit tax election is an opportunity for a taxpayer to choose his tax treatment
by "merely tell[ing] the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service") how he wishes to be
treated for tax purposes; he need not take any specific non-tax actions or structure his
financial or legal dealings in any particular way in order to obtain his preferred tax
treatment." Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in
the FederalIncome Tax, 47 HARv. J.ON LEGIS. 21, 22 (2010).
12 Of course, all tax elections affect multiple taxpayers, at least indirectly. This is
because, an individual's decision to make a tax election that reduces his tax burden also
reduces the amount of revenue collected by the government, thereby indirectly affecting all
of the other U.S. taxpayers (i.e., either because the government will have less money
available to provide government services or because the other taxpayers will have to pay
more tax in order for the government to collect a particular amount of revenue). This article
generally does not focus on these taxpayers who are affected indirectly; instead, as the
examples provided herein will demonstrate, this article generally focuses on taxpayers who
experience an increase or decrease in their tax burdens (or in the tax burdens of a corporation
in which they hold an interest) as a direct result of the terms of a tax election.
In part, this negotiation is incentivized because the election is generally not a zerosum game among the affected taxpayers. As the example above with Pam & Larry
illustrates, coordination between taxpayers with respect to the making of an election can
reallocate to the taxpayers money that would have otherwise been collected by the
government. Cf McAdams, supra note 10, at 869-71 (discussing the need for coordination
among private parties, particularly in situations where both parties can benefit from that
cooperation).

6
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bargain effectively about these tax issues.
But, why should we care if taxpayers have trouble reaching a private
agreement about how to make a tax election in the way that best reduces
their aggregate tax burden? After all, we face significant budget deficits,
and the government collects more revenue when taxpayers fail to make taxminimizing choices. There are several responses.
Sometimes, part of Congress's policy rationale for providing an
election is to facilitate "private ordering" and negotiation among individual
taxpayers.14 Also, in certain circumstances, tax policymakers assume that
taxpayers can bargain effectively with each other, and the policymakers
explicitly rely on that assumption when designing tax regulations. In these
contexts, impediments to bargaining can frustrate Congressional intent and
undermine the efficacy of regulations. Moreover, if policymakers have seen
fit to provide a tax election for good reason,16 the benefits of the election
should be available to all sets of taxpayers and not merely the sophisticated
or well-advised taxpayers who can overcome the impediments to reaching
agreements that maximize their aggregate welfare. Further, as long as these
focal points for tax bargaining continue to be part of the tax law, we must
acknowledge that taxpayers will have an incentive to bargain around these
focal points, whether or not that bargaining is desirable. Thus, reducing the
transaction costs of this bargaining would seem to be in the interests of even
those who object to the presence of elections in the tax law.17 Additionally,
14 See, e.g., Patricia G. Lewis & Julie W. Davis, Act Alters Tax Provisions For
Divorcing Couples, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 27, 1984 ("Conference Committee provisions appear
to be a compromise between eliminating the alimony deduction altogether and providing a
'private ordering' system as proposed initially by the ABA Tax Section.").
See, e.g., 73 Fed. Reg. 49965-02, 49970 (Aug. 25, 2008) (explaining, in support of
the conclusion that an election should be made unilaterally by the corporation disposing of
the target corporation stock, "[i]n the case of a sale or exchange, the purchasers should be
able to protect their interests in any purchase contract").
1 Elections can be useful in the tax code for several reasons including "reconciling
discontinuous [tax] regimes, facilitating tax classification, [and] promoting simplicity and
administrability." Field, supra note 11, at 33-65. 1 certainly acknowledge, however, that
some elections (and, as others may argue, the vast majority of elections) may have little, if
any normative merit. Id. at 26-33 (explaining that elections can be criticized as "complex,
costly, wasteful, revenue reducing, and inequitable," and summarizing the scholarly critiques
of the presence of elections in the tax law). Nevertheless, for purposes of this article, I will
generally assume that the elections discussed herein (and some additional elections) are
useful in the tax law.
17 It is possible that those who object to the use of elections in the tax law might prefer
to create barriers to bargaining that are as high as possible in order to drastically reduce
taxpayers' abilities to use the elections. This could effectively eliminate the elections from
the tax law even without removing the statutory or regulatory language that provides the
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barriers to bargaining may result in unexpected or undesirable distributional
consequences and may pose an increased risk of government whipsaw.
Where impediments to bargaining create these concerns, we should
think carefully about the bargaining setting that is created by the parameters
of the tax bargaining focal points. Thus, in order to facilitate bargaining
and reduce bargaining costs, this article argues that policymakers should
(and how policymakers should) take impediments to bargaining into
account when designing the election parameters. This is particularly
important when policymakers (1) determine how the power to make an
election is allocated among the affected taxpayers and (2) select the default
rule that will apply if no election is made. Further, this article attempts to
provide some guidance about how to design these parameters in different
contexts.
As examples, this article will discuss tax bargaining focal points in
three settings where the bargaining dynamic can differ significantly:
divorce, employment, and corporate acquisitions. Part II explains elections
available in these contexts in order to illustrate the incentives that taxpayers
have to negotiate about whether to make an election. Part III explores
taxpayers' abilities to reach agreements about whether to make elections
that minimize their aggregate tax burden. This discussion proceeds, first,
under the assumptions of the Coase theorem (no transaction costs and
rational parties), and then, in light of impediments to bargaining (including
transaction costs, cognitive biases, and sheer irrationality). This part
concludes that impediments to bargaining can be significant and should be
taken into account when designing the parameters of tax bargaining focal
points.
Part IV analyzes how to design key election parameters in order to
facilitate bargaining and reduce bargaining costs. Specifically, Part IV.A
recommends that elections should generally be made jointly by the
taxpayers affected by the election, rather than unilaterally by one party.
This part argues that joint elections can empower the less-informed

election. Even under this view, the insights in this article can be useful-by appreciating
how impediments to bargaining affect taxpayers' abilities to reach tax-minimizing
agreements in a variety of contexts, others will be better equipped to heighten these barriers.
This is not a route that I recommend, but my hope is that the analysis in this article will be
valuable regardless of one's view of tax elections.
Of course, it is entirely possible that, at least in certain cases (perhaps divorce), that
the parties reach bargains without regard to the underlying legal parameters or entitlements.
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES VII
(1991) ("[P]eople frequently resolve their disputes in cooperative fashion without paying any
attention to the laws that apply to those disputes.").
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bargaining party, facilitate cooperation by leveraging cognitive biases, and
minimize government whipsaw. This discussion also addresses ways to
minimize the potential adverse consequences of joint elections. Then, Part
IV.B discusses the more difficult issue of selecting default rules for explicit
tax elections that serve as focal points for private bargaining. This part
explains the potential information-forcing benefits of "penalty default rules"
(i.e., default rules that are purposefully set at what one or more parties
would not want, in order to give those parties an incentive to contract
around the default) and the potential transaction-cost-reducing benefits of
"preference-meeting default rules" (i.e., default rules that most closely
reflect the tax treatment that the directly affected taxpayers would likely
have bargained for, assuming costless bargaining and assuming that
taxpayers generally prefer to minimize their tax burdens). Further, this part
evaluates our ability to effectively design these types of default rules, and
assuming that they can be designed, this part tries to weigh the costs and
benefits of these different alternatives. Finally, this part explains that
various other policy considerations (like distributive and other social policy
concerns, simplicity, and administrability) may influence the default rule
determination when the penalty default/preference-meeting default analysis
produces conflicting or indeterminate results.
Part V provides generalizable guidance about how to systematically
coordinate the analyses of the two election parameters in different
situations. As examples, this part returns to the tax bargaining focal points
in the divorce, employment, and corporate acquisition contexts. As a result,
this part makes a few specific recommendations for modifying these
elections. Part VI concludes.
II. EXPLICIT ELECTIONS AS FOCAL POINTS FOR TAX BARGAINING

The tax law includes several explicit elections that affect multiple
taxpayers. These taxpayers have an incentive to negotiate with each other
about whether to make the election. These opportunities for negotiation
arise in a variety of contexts, including in connection with divorce,
employment, and corporate acquisitions.19 To the extent that you are
Entity classification and corporate/partnership elections are additional common
contexts in which these opportunities for negotiation arise. For example, all shareholders are
required to consent to a corporation's S corporation election, but a check-the-box election
under Treasury Regulation section 1.7701-3 is made by the entity itself, the tax law does not
mandate that the members of the entity all consent to the election. Additionally, other
corporate elections and partnership elections are generally made by the entity itself; although
these elections affect the shareholders and partners, respectively, these owners are generally
only entitled to the right to consent to (or vote on) such elections to the extent that the
19
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familiar with the operation of, and incentives created by, these tax
elections,20 you may want to skip directly to Part III.21
A. Elections Available in Connection with Divorce
In the divorce context, the election regarding the tax treatment of
alimony payments and the election regarding the allocation of the
dependency exemption can impact the tax treatment of both former spouses,
thereby setting up focal points for negotiation.22 The tax consequences of
these elections and the manner in which the elections are made affect the
desirability of the elections and thus affect the incentives that the parties
have to negotiate about whether to make the elections. These elections will
be discussed briefly in turn.
1. Tax Treatment of Alimony Payments 2 3
Alimony payments24 are generally deductible by the payor25 and

applicable shareholders' agreement or partnership agreement provides.
20 Specifically, Part II.A addresses the elections available in connection

with the tax
treatment of alimony and the allocation of the dependency exemption among unmarried
parents. I.R.C. §§ 71(a)-(b), 215(a), 152(e). Part II.B addresses the section 83(b) election
available in connection with the transfer of restricted property in compensation for services.
Part Il.C addresses the regular section 338 election, the section 338(h)(10) election, and the
section 336(e) election, all of which are available in connection with corporate acquisitions.
21
Also, readers may also want to skip directly to Part III on the off chance that they
are more interested in the conceptual aspects of this article and are less interested in the
specific details of the relevant elections.
22 See generally Martin Zelder, For Better orfor Worse? Is Bargaining in Marriage
and Divorce Efficient? in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 157, 164-67

(Anthony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2009) (discussing the bargaining setting, in
general, in divorce).
23 This section's discussion is limited to the election available with respect to the tax
treatment of alimony payments. For a more comprehensive discussion of the tax treatment of
divorce, see generally Laura Bigler, A Change is Needed: The Taxation of Alimony and
Child Support, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 361 (2000); Roland L. Hjorth, Divorce, Taxes, and the
1984 Tax Reform Act: An Inadequate Response to an Old Problem, 61 WASH. L. REV. 151
(1986); Marci Kelly, Callinga Spade a Club: The Failure of Matrimonial Tax Reform, 44
TAX LAW. 787 (1991); Laurie Malman, Unfinished Reform: The Tax Consequences of
Divorce, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363 (1986); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Tax Aspects ofDivorce and
Separation, 32 FAM. L.Q. 221 (1998); Beverly I. Moran, Welcome to the Funhouse: The
Incredible Maze ofModern Divorce Taxation, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 117(1989).
24 Alimony payments are distinguished from child support payments, which are treated
differently for tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 71(c); see also Bigler, supra note 23 (arguing that
alimony payments and child support payments should be treated in the same way for tax
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includable in the income of the recipient.26 However, the parties can opt out
of this tax treatment so that the payment would not be includable in the
income of the recipient and would not be deductible by the payor.27 To do
so, the divorce or separation instrument must designate28 the alimony
payment as not includable in the recipient's gross income and not
deductible by the payor,29 and the alimony recipient must attach a copy of
the divorce or separation instrument to her30 "first filed return of tax (Form
1040) for each year in which the designation applies.'31 The "divorce or
separation instrument" in which the designation must be made can include a
written separation agreement among the parties and any subsequent writing
signed by both parties that refers to the original written separation
agreement.32 Thus, it is possible that, as long as there is joint action by both
former spouses, they could "change the tax treatment of the payments from
year to year." 33
The default tax treatment of alimony payments (deductible by the
payor, includable by the recipient) generally results in an overall tax benefit
to the former spouses, in the aggregate, if the payor is in a higher tax
bracket than the recipient. 34 If, however, the recipient is expected to be in a
higher tax bracket than the payor, the parties may wish to elect out of the
default treatment either permanently or in a given year, in order to achieve a
purposes).
25 I.R.C. § 215(a).
26 I.R.C. § 71(a).
27 Historically, this is how alimony payments were treated prior to 1942:
[N]either deductible by the payor nor includable by the payee. In 1942[,
however] Congress enacted the statutory predecessors of §§71 and 215 of the
Internal Revenue Code, taxing alimony to the recipient and allowing a deduction
to the payor. The purpose of this statutory 'income splitting' rule was to eliminate
variations in the taxation of alimony attributable to differences in local law and to
moderate the effect of high wartime tax rates on the payors of alimony.
McMahon, supra note 23, at 222 (citations omitted).
28 The designation generally needs to be specific to ensure that the Service will respect
the non-alimony tax treatment.
29 I.R.C. § 71(b).
30 See supra note 2 (explaining this article's use of stereotypical gender roles).
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT(b), Q&A (8) (1984).
32 Id. The divorce or separation instrument can also include a judicial decree of
divorce. Id.
3

CINDY L. WOFFORD, BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF, INC., TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO:

DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, 515-2nd

1 II.D.8.

34 This is a reasonably good assumption given the factors considered when
determining the amount of alimony payments.
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better overall tax result for the former spouses. If the election is made,3 5 the
alimony would become nondeductible to the payor and nonincludable for
the recipient. The election shifts the nominal tax burden from the recipient
to the payor, and the payor would be worse off economically because of his
increased tax bill. To induce the payor to join in making the election and to
accept this adverse consequence, the parties may negotiate, and the
recipient may agree to accept a smaller alimony payment in order to
compensate the payor for his increased tax burden.
2.

Allocating the Dependency Exemption for a Child of Divorced Parents

Divorced parents with a dependent child must determine which parent
(if either) will be able to take the dependency exemption for such child. 36if
the custodial parent would, under the regular rules of section 152, be
entitled to claim the dependency exemption for the child,3 7 the custodial
parent has the power to release that dependency exemption to the
noncustodial parent under section 152(e).38 In order to enable the
noncustodial parent to take the dependency exemption, the custodial parent
must sign a written declaration attesting that she 39 will not claim the
dependency exemption for the child for the taxable year, and the
35

For an example of language that can be included in a divorce or separation
instrument to designate a payment as non-alimony for tax purposes, see WOFFORD, supra
note 33, Worksheet 12.
This determination is relevant not only for divorced parents of a dependent child, but
also for parents who were never married. I.R.C. § 152(e)(1)(A)(iii); Treas. Reg. 1.1524(g)(ex. 11) (applying these rules to parents who never married). Further, the "dependent"
with respect to whom a dependency exemption is available can be not only a minor child,
but can also be a dependent child up to the age of 24 in certain circumstances, a disabled
child of any age, and other qualifying relatives. I.R.C. § 152(a), (c)-(d). For simplicity, the
discussion will focus on the context of dependent minor children of divorced parents, but the
discussion is generalizable to a broader set of circumstances.
3A custodial parent may not be entitled to claim the dependency exemption if the
parents do not provide a threshold level of support of the child. I.R.C. § 152. However, for
the remainder of the analysis, this article will assume that, setting aside any election, the
custodial parent would be entitled to claim the dependency exemption under the regular rules
of section 152. See also generally WOFFORD, supra note 33, at % VII.C., VII.C.5.c.
While it is increasingly common for divorced parents to have some degree of joint
custody of minor children, the Code still requires that one parent be characterized as
"custodial" and the other parent characterized as "noncustodial," based upon which parent
has physical custody of the child for more nights during the year. I.R.C. § 152(e)(4); Treas.
Reg. § 1.152-4(d) (2008). Where the child resides with each parent for an equal number of
nights during the year, the parent with the higher adjusted gross income is treated as the
custodial parent for that year. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(d)(4) (2008).
3 See supra note 2.
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noncustodial parent must attach that declaration to his tax return for the
taxable year.40 For taxable years beginning after July 2, 2008, the custodial
parent's release of the dependency exemption must be on an IRS Form
8332 or must be a "document executed for the sole purpose of serving as a
written declaration" releasing the exemption. 4 1 Note that an effective
election requires joint action because, although only the custodial parent
must sign the declaration releasing the dependency exemption, the
noncustodial parent must attach the declaration to his tax return.
The divorced parents may negotiate about the allocation of the
dependency exemption, and in order to reach the best overall tax result for
both parents, they will likely try to allocate the dependency exemption to
the parent for whom it has the most value. This likely means allocating the
dependency exemption to the parent in the higher tax bracket; however, the
parents should be careful about this decision because the dependency
exemption does get phased out for parents at very high-income levels.42
Additionally, the allocation of other tax benefits, such as the child tax
credit, depends on the allocation of the dependency exemption, 4 3 so the
value of these other benefits should also be taken into account when parents
negotiate about the allocation of the dependency exemption. 44
B. The Employment Context: The Section 83(b) Election
Another election that affects multiple taxpayers and that can serve as a
focal point for negotiation among those taxpayers is the section 83(b)
election. In general, when property is transferred in connection with the
performance of services and the property is nontransferable and subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture, the recipient of the property does not pay

I.R.C. § 152(e).
41 Treas. Reg. 1.152-4(e)(1)(ii) (2008). For taxable years beginning prior to July
2,
2008, the noncustodial parent could substantiate his claim to the dependency exemption by
attaching a copy of the court decree or separation agreement. The substantiation requirement
was changed because "[d]ivorce decrees, separation agreements, and similar instruments are
complex documents that may be subject to differing interpretations governed by state
law.... [This change] will improve tax administration and reduce controversy." T.D. 9408,
2008-33 I.R.B. 323. Note that there is a grandfather rule providing that if the divorce decree
was issued prior to July 2, 2008, the noncustodial parent may continue to use that decree as
substantiation for his right to claim the dependency exemption. Id.
42 I.R.C. § 151(d)(3).
43 I.R.S. Notice 2006-86, 2006-2 C.B. 680.
44 But see Rev. Proc. 2008-48, 2008-36 I.R.B. 586 (providing that a child will be
treated as a dependent of a noncustodial parent for various provisions of the Code even if the
custodial parent has not released the dependency exemption).
40

2011]

Tax Elections & Private Bargaining

13

current income tax on the value received; rather, the recipient includes the
value of the property (less any amount paid for the property) in income only
when the property first becomes transferable or when the restriction
lapses.45 The employee,46 however, can make a unilateral election to
change these tax consequences. If the employee makes an election under
section 83(b), then he or she must take the value of the transferred property
(less any amount paid for the property) into income in the year of the
transfer; generally, no additional income tax will be imposed until the
employee disposes of the property. 4 7
An employee may want to make the election, for example, if the value
of the transferred property is low at the time of the grant (such that the
immediate tax cost would be small) and/or if the value of the transferred
property is expected to grow substantially by the time the restrictions lapse
(such that the later appreciation could be taxed to him at capital gains rates
rather than at ordinary income rates). In contrast, accelerating the tax event
by making a section 83(b) election may not be desirable for the employee,
for example, if the employee is concerned about forfeiting the property or if
the immediate tax cost would be large. 48
The section 83(b) election affects the employer as well as the employee
because the employee's election affects the timing and amount of any

§ 83(a).
46 These rules are applicable to service providers, generally, including
independent
contractors who receive restricted property in compensation for services rendered. For
simplicity, the article will generally discuss the section 83(b) election in the context of the
employee/employer relationship.
47
I.R.C. § 83(b)(1). In addition to the effect that the election has on the timing of the
recipient's income, the election also affects the characterof the recipient's income. Under
the default rule, the recipient pays tax at ordinary income rates on the entire value of the
property (less any amount paid for the property) at the time the restrictions lapse. In contrast,
if an election is made, the recipient pays tax at ordinary income rates on the value of the
property at the time of the grant (less any amount paid for the property), and he generally
pays tax at capital gains rates on any further appreciation.
48 See generally Michael S. Knoll, The Section 83(b) Election for Restricted Stock: A
Joint Tax Perspective, 59 SMU L. REV. 721, 729-36 (2006) (concluding that, under certain
assumptions, the election may be unfavorable because "the election increases the employee's
taxes because she can do better by purchasing shares than by making the election"); David I.
Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REv. 695, 707 (2004)
(discussing situations in which it may or may not be desirable for an employee to make a
section 83(b) election); Robert L. McDonald, Is it Optimal to Accelerate the Payment of
Income Tax on Share-BasedCompensation?, (Sept. 19, 2003), http://www.kellogg.nwu.edu/
facutly/mcdonald/htm/ (demonstrating that it is often not optimal for an employee to make a
section 83(b) election).
45 I.R.C.
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49
compensation deduction that may be available to the employer.
Specifically, the employer (i.e., the transferor of the property) may take a
compensation deduction in the taxable year in which the service provider
includes the value of the property in income, and the amount of the
deduction available to the employer is limited to the amount of gross
income that the employee takes into account as a result of the transfer. 50
Thus, if the employee makes a section 83(b) election, the employer will get
a deduction in the current year in an amount equal to the employee's
income inclusion. In contrast, if no section 83(b) election is made, the
employer will not be entitled to a compensation deduction until sometime in
the future when the property becomes transferable or the restrictions lapse,
but the amount of the deduction may be larger if the value of the property
has appreciated in the interim. Thus, the employer's tax treatment may vary
depending on whether the employee makes the section 83(b) election.5 1 In
addition, the employer may have non-tax reasons to care about whether the
employee makes the election. For example, the employee's decision about
whether to make the election may give the employer valuable information
regarding the employee's expectation about the likely change in value of
the property during the restriction period or regarding the employee's
expectation that the restrictions will lapse without forfeiture.52
Given the impact of the election on the employer, the employer may
want to negotiate with the employee about whether the section 83(b)
election will be made. 53 For example, the agreement that grants the
restricted property to the employee may contain a provision obligating the
employee to make the election, prohibiting the employee from making the
election, or requiring that the employee obtain the employer's consent

49 This assumes that the compensation would be deductible under section 162.
So I.R.C. § 83(h).
S But see Knoll, supra note 48, at 727-29, 736 (concluding that, under certain
assumptions, "the employee's 83(b) election has no impact on the employer because the
employer can neutralize the effect of the 83(b) election by using its tax savings to purchase
shares"). Nevertheless, an employer may also care about an employee's decision about
whether to make the election for tax reasons if the employer is not able to make itself
indifferent to the timing of the tax benefit. Jennifer L. Blouin & Mary Ellen Carter, The
Economics of Restricted Stock and the Section 83(b) Election 8 (Feb. 2010) (unpublished
article), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-1 561923.
52 This could be particularly valuable if the forfeiture restriction is tied to the
employee's tenure with the firm. If the employee refuses to make the election, this may
indicate the employee does not expect to stay with the firm for the entire tenure period.
53 See Knoll, supra note 48, at 725 ("emphasiz[ing] a joint tax planning approach"
between the employer and the employee).
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before making the election. 54 Absent such an agreement, the employer
generally lacks the power to decide whether the election is made.
Regardless of whether the employee makes the election decision completely
unilaterally or whether the employer has negotiated for some ability to
participate in the election decision, the employee must provide a copy of the
section 83(b) election to the employer. 55
C. CorporateAcquisition Elections
In addition, three major tax elections can serve as focal points for
negotiation among parties to corporate acquisitions. Specifically, when
most or all of the stock of a target corporation is acquired, one or more of
the parties involved in the transaction may be able to make an election that
causes the actual stock acquisition to be treated as a deemed asset
acquisition for tax purposes. While conceptually similar, the three elections
(the "regular" section 338 election,56 the section 338(h)(10) election,57 and
the section 336(e) election ) differ in several respects, including with
respect to the transactions to which these elections apply, with respect to
which party or parties have the power to make the elections, and with
respect to the tax consequences (and hence the desirability) of making the
elections. These differences affect the incentives that the various parties
have with respect to entering into negotiations with the other parties about
whether the election will be made.
Briefly, a regular section 338 election, which is available when a single
corporate buyer purchases at least 80% of the vote and value of the stock of
a target corporation5 9 within a twelve-month period (a "qualified stock

54 See Blouin & Carter, supra note 51 at 2, 31-32 (finding that some public firms
either require or prohibit a section 83(b) election for property granted in connection with the
provision of services).
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(d) (1978).
s6 I.R.C. § 338(a), (g). Elections made pursuant section 338(a), but not pursuant to the
special rule in section 338(h)(10), are described herein as "regular" section 338 elections;
this distinguishes such elections from those made pursuant to section 338(h)(10). See
generally MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS
205-06 (2010) (using this terminology).
57 I.R.C. § 338(h)(10).
58

I.R.C. § 336(e); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.336-1, 73 Fed. Reg. 49965-02 (Aug. 25,

2008).
59 The acquisition must involve at least 80% of the total voting power of the target
corporation stock and at least 80% of the total value of the target corporation stock. I.R.C.
§§ 338(d)(3), 1504(a)(2). Section 1504 provides some special rules for determining whether
the 80% vote and value rule has been satisfied. These rules also apply for purposes of
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purchase" or "QSP"),60 can be made unilaterally by the buyer
corporation.61 The election generally adversely affects the tax treatment of
the buyer,62 while the sellers are generally indifferent to whether the
election is made.63 In limited circumstances (e.g., where the target
corporation is a foreign corporation), however, a regular section 338
election can confer tax benefits on the buyer64 while adversely affecting

determining whether this threshold has been met. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1504(a)(4) (providing
that certain debt-like preferred stock is disregarded for purposes of the section 1504(a)(2)
determination).
6o I.R.C. § 338(a); see also I.R.C. § 338(h)(3) (defining purchase). With a regular
section 338 election, the sellers can be individuals, corporations, partnerships, others, or
some combination of the above. This is a key difference from transactions where a section
338(h)(10) election can be made. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
61 I.R.C. § 338(a). The seller(s) need not consent to the making of the election unless
the parties' contract provides that the sellers will have a voice in the decision. For example,
the parties could include a provision in the acquisition agreement pursuant to which the
buyer corporation agrees not to make the regular section 338 election without the consent of
the sellers.
62 If a regular section 338 election is made, then an extra layer of current tax
corporate level tax on the target corporation - is triggered as a result of the deemed asset
sale. I.R.C. § 338(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.338-4 (2001). The economic burden of that additional
tax generally falls on the buyer corporation, unless the parties negotiate and agree to shift all
or part of that burden to the sellers. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338-10(a) (2007), 1.338-l(b)(3)(i)
(2009). Such a shift could occur, for example, via a reduction in the purchase price for the
stock or via a provision in the acquisition agreement pursuant to which the sellers agree to
indemnify the buyer corporation for pre-closing taxes of the target corporation.
Of course, the election generally results in a step-up in the basis of the target
corporation's assets. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-5 (2001). Paying tax now in exchange for extra
basis to be used later is generally a disadvantageous trade because the taxpayer foregoes the
time value of money used to pay the current tax.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a regular section 338 election can be desirable if, for
example, the target corporation has significant net operating losses (NOLs). In such a case,
the target corporation's NOLs can partly or entirely offset the corporate level tax imposed as
a result of the deemed asset sale, thereby enabling a step-up in the basis of the target
corporation's assets at minimal or no current tax cost.
Note that, for purposes of discussion, this article will generally assume, unless
otherwise stated, that the target corporation's assets have appreciated in value, such that a
deemed asset sale will result in the recognition of gain and a step up in basis.
The target corporation shareholders will recognize gain or loss from the actual sale
of their target corporation stock. This is generally true regardless of whether a regular
section 338 election is made.
If the target corporation is a foreign corporation, then the regular section 338
election can be beneficial for the buyer corporation because, for example, the regular section
338 election steps up the target corporation's basis in its assets and wipes out the foreign
target corporation's historic earnings & profits (E&P), thereby potentially reducing the buyer
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some sellers, in which case the parties may have an incentive to bargain
about whether the election will be made.
The section 338(h)(10) election, which is available when a single
corporate buyer makes a QSP of the stock of a target corporation that is a
member of the consolidated or affiliated group of the target's parent
corporation (i.e., the seller corporation),66 is made jointly by the buyer
corporation and the seller corporation.67 The election affects the tax
treatment of both the buyer and the seller. The buyer generally obtains tax
benefits from the election if the assets of the target corporation have

corporation's future subpart F inclusions. See JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION T B6.04[1] (2009) (describing the tax treatment of a buyer of
foreign corporation stock when a regular section 338 election is made); D. KEVIN DOLAN,
U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS & JOINT VENTURES 2.03[2][c]
(2008).
65 If a regular section 338 election is made for a target corporation that is a controlled
foreign corporation (CFC), U.S. shareholders of the CFC could, among other possible
consequences, have increased taxation under subpart F. This could occur, for example, if the
deemed asset sale gave rise to subpart F income while the actual stock sale would not have
given rise to such income. See Treas. Reg. § 1.338-9(f), Ex. 3 (2001); see also Kimberly S.
Blanchard, Cross-BorderAcquisition Patterns Implicating Section 338: Recommendations
for Reform, in 843 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE: TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS &

RESTRUCTURINGS 607, 625 (2008) ("[I]f old [CFC target corporation's] deemed sale of assets
gives rise to subpart F income, that subpart F income will be taxable to any selling
shareholders that are U.S. shareholders of [the CFC target corporation]. Moreover, if the
deemed sale generates E&P, that additional E&P will support an increased subpart F
inclusion (see section 952(c)) and/or an increased section 1248 pick-up (section 1248(d)(1)
prevents double counting)."); DOLAN, supra note 64, at 2.03[2][b] (describing the possible
tax consequences to U.S. shareholders who sell stock in a CFC where a regular section 338
election is made); KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 64, at 1B6.03[l I].
In acknowledgement of the risk that selling shareholders could be liable for increased
tax and to help ensure that the shareholders of the target corporation correctly report their
U.S. federal income tax burden, the Treasury Regulations provide that a buyer corporation
that makes a regular section 338 election with respect to a CFC must provide notice to the
U.S. persons that are shareholders of the target if the regular section 338 election will affect
the U.S. federal income tax treatment of such U.S. persons. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-2(e)(4)
(2001). This notice requirement also applies if the target corporation is a passive foreign
investment company. Id. Failure to provide such notice in a timely fashion may invalidate
the regular section 338 election. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-2(e)(4)(v), (vi) (2001).
66
Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-l(c) (2007). A section 338(h)(10) election may also be
made with respect to a target corporation that is an S corporation. Id. For simplicity,
however, this article will generally focus on situations where the target corporation is a
member of the selling parent corporation's consolidated group.
67 Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-I(c)(3)
(2007).
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appreciated,68 and the election often changes the amount of gain recognized
by the seller (which may increase or decrease the tax burden depending on
the circumstances).69 Evidence suggests that buyers have been willing to
share part of the value of their tax benefits with sellers by increasing the
purchase price for transactions where a section 338(h)(10) election will be
made. 70 In limited circumstances (e.g., where the assets of the target
68 A section 338(h)(10) election generally results in a step-up in the basis of the assets
of the target corporation (which, at the end of the transaction, is owned by the buyer
corporation). Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-l(d)(3) (2007). In contrast to the regular section
338 election that results in the recognition of tax on the deemed asset sale in addition to the
recognition of tax on the actual stock sale, the section 338(h)(10) election results in the
recognition of tax on the deemed asset sale generally in lieu of the recognition of tax on the
actual stock sale. Thus, with a section 338(h)(10) election, the target corporation is able to
get a stepped-up basis in its assets with the imposition of only one level of current tax.
The stepped-up basis that the target corporation takes in its assets ensures that only two
layers of tax will ultimately be imposed on the sale of the target's business - corporate level
tax upon the deemed sale of the target's corporate assets, and shareholder level tax when the
parent corporation ultimately distributes the sales proceeds out to its shareholders. Without
the stepped-up basis from the section 338(h)(10) election, there would be an additional layer
of tax lurking. In addition to the corporate level tax on the parent corporation upon the sale
of the target stock and the shareholder level tax imposed when the parent corporation
ultimately distributes the sales proceeds out to its shareholders, the target corporation would
still have its historic basis in its assets. This means there could be an additional layer of
corporate level tax imposed on the target if and when the target later disposes of its assets.
See generally W. Eugene Seago & Reza Barkhi, In the Process of Preventing Triple
Taxation of a Subsidiary's Income, Congress Createda Great Indoor Game, 109 TAX NOTES
1081, 1081 (2005). The tax advantage of the section 338(h)(10) election thus inures to the
benefit of the buyer corporation, in that the target corporation (owned by the buyer
corporation post-acquisition) has stepped-up basis in its assets and will not be subject to
additional tax on appreciation that accrued pre-acquisition.
69 Without the section 338(h)(10) election, the seller's recognized gain or loss is
determined based on the seller's actual stock sale. If a section 338(h)(10) election is made,
the actual sale of target corporation stock is disregarded for tax purposes, and instead, the
gain or loss recognized on the transaction is determined based on the target corporation's
deemed sale of its assets. I.R.C. § 338(h)(10)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-l(d) (2007).
These amounts of gain can differ, depending on the difference between the seller
corporation's basis in its target corporation stock and the target corporation's basis in its
assets, among other things. Note that where the target corporation is a member of parent
corporation's consolidated group before the acquisition, the parent corporation (the seller)
generally bears the economic burden of the tax on the deemed asset sale, at least in the
absence of an agreement between the parties to shift that burden. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)1(d)(3), (7) (2007).
70 See Merle Erickson, To Elect or Not to Elect: That is the Tax Question, CAPITAL
IDEAS Winter 2001, available at http://www.chicagobooth.edulcapideas/win01/tax.html
(citing Merle Erickson & Shiing-wu Wang, The Effect of Transaction Structure on Price:
Evidence from Subsidiary Sales, 30 J. ACCT. & ECON. 61 (2000), which did an empirical
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corporation have declined in value), the section 338(h)(10) election may
disadvantage the buyer while benefiting the seller,71 in which case it may be
in the buyer's interests to negotiate with the seller as to whether the election
will be made.
The section 336(e) election,72 which is available when a single
corporation disposes73 of at least 80% of the vote and value of the stock of a
target corporate subsidiary within a 12 month period (a "qualified stock
disposition" or "QSD"),74 creates incentives for bargaining that are
study and found that the "purchase prices were higher in transactions where the [section
338(h)(10)] election was made ... [illustrating that] acquirers are willing to pay a premium
acquisition price to obtain the tax benefits derived from the election."). The section
338(h)(10) election may increase the total amount of tax due by the selling parent
corporation. In that case, the parent corporation's individual preference would be to oppose a
section 338(h)(10) election; however, if the election is sufficiently valuable to the buyer
corporation, the buyer corporation may be willing to increase the purchase price in an
amount sufficient to compensate the seller(s) for bearing the additional tax burden. See id.;
see also Marshall P. Bartlett, The Joint Election Under Section 338(h)(10), 42 TAX LAW.
235, 237 (1989) (noting that where "the advantage [of the section 338(h)(10) election] to the
purchaser [is] greater than the detriment to the seller . . . [t]he logical solution is to negotiate
a purchase price adjustment that will protect the seller from the harm of any additional tax
liability from the section 338(h)(10) election ... [, thereby] induc[ing] the seller to join in
the election.").
In some situations, the election may reduce the total amount of current tax due by the
selling parent corporation, in which case the election may benefit both the buyer and the
seller. See generally GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 56, at 206.1.2. Then, the seller is
likely to prefer that the election be made, even if the buyer corporation does not compensate
the seller for participating in the election.
7i This could happen if asset acquisition treatment would result in a step down in the
target corporation's basis in its assets (a disadvantage for the buyer), while asset acquisition
treatment reduced the total amount of gain recognized by the seller on the transaction (a
benefit for the seller).
72 Section 336(e), which empowers the Secretary to promulgate regulations allowing
for an election to treat the disposition of the stock of a subsidiary corporation as the
disposition of the subsidiary corporation's assets, was enacted in 1986, but such regulations
were proposed only in 2008 and have not yet been finalized. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.336-5,
73 Fed. Reg. 49965-02 (Aug. 25, 2008). Unless otherwise stated, the analysis herein assumes
that the regulations will be finalized as proposed.
7 This "disposition" can be through sale, exchange, or distribution. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.336-l(b)(4), 73 Fed. Reg. 49965-02, 49972 (Aug. 25, 2008).
74 Id. at § 1.336-l(b)(5). Note that there can be a single acquirer or multiple acquirers
of the target corporation stock, and that the acquirer(s) can be individuals, corporations,
partnerships, others, or a combination. Id. at §§ 1.336-l(b)(2), (5); see also I.R.C. § 7701(a)
(defining "person"). If a stock disposition would qualify as both a QSP for section 338
purposes and a QSD for section 336 purposes, it will generally be treated as a QSP and not
as a QSD. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.336-1(b)(5)(ii), 73 Fed. Reg. 49965-02 (Aug. 25, 2008).
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substantially the same as those described for the section 338(h)(10)
election. 75 Unlike the section 338(h)(10) election, however, which is made
jointly by the buyer and seller, the section 336(e) election would be made
unilaterally by the corporation that is disposing of the target corporation
stock. In proposing that the section 336(e) election be made unilaterally
Like the section 338(h)(10) election, a section 336(e) election "avoid[s] the triple tax
that would arise in a situation where the stock of a target corporation is sold, exchanged or
distributed and both the target corporation's assets and its shares have increased in value."
New York State Bar Ass'n, Report on Proposed Regulations Implementing Section 336(e)
2009 TNT 1-21, at 1-2 (Dec. 31, 2008); cf supra note 68 (discussing the possibility of triple
taxation in the absence of a section 338(h)(10) election). Further, where the assets of the
target corporation have appreciated, a section 336(e) election benefits the acquirers because
the election generally results in a step-up in the basis of the assets of the target corporation
(which, at the end of the transaction, is owned by the buyer corporation). Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.336-2(b)(1)(ii), 73 Fed. Reg. 49965-02 (Aug. 25, 2008). On the other hand, acquirers
may not want the election to be made if the target corporation's assets have declined in
value; this is because a section 336(e) election would result in stepped-down basis in the
asset.
For the corporation disposing of the target corporation stock, a section 336(e) election
may change the amount of gain or loss recognized. This is because section 336(e) election
causes the amount of gain/loss recognized to be determined based on the deemed asset
disposition rather than based on the actual disposition of target corporation stock, provided
that, where an asset disposition is deemed to occur, the target corporation will be barred
from recognizing certain losses. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.336-2(b)(1)(i), (iii), 73 Fed. Reg.
49965-02 (Aug. 25, 2008). But see, e.g., New York State Bar Ass'n, supra at 2, 27-36
(criticizing this limitation on the ability of the target corporation to recognize losses and
suggesting a change to this limitation). Note that, if the target corporation filed a
consolidated return with its parent corporation prior to the transaction, then the selling parent
corporation will generally bear the economic burden of any gain or loss recognized as a
result of the deemed asset disposition. Thus, if the election will reduce the amount of gain
recognized or increase the amount of loss recognized, then the seller will generally benefit
from the election; if the election will increase the amount of gain recognized or decrease the
amount of loss recognized, then the seller will generally not benefit from the election.
Ultimately, particularly where the acquirers would benefit from the election and the
selling parent corporation might not benefit from the election, the acquirers may have an
incentive to negotiate with the seller corporation in order to ensure that the election is made.
Similarly, if the selling parent corporation would benefit from the election and the acquirer
would not, the parties may also have an incentive to negotiate about whether the election will
be made.
7

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.336-2(h), 73 Fed. Reg. 49965-02 (Aug. 25, 2008).
Commentators have criticized this unilateral election as contrary to legislative intent. See,
e.g., Letter from Wendy Richards, 2008 TNT 232-66 (Nov. 24, 2008) (suggesting that the
section 336(e) election should generally be made jointly); New York State Bar Ass'n supra
note 75, at 3, 101-09 ("At least where the seller and the target corporation do not file a
consolidated return, the Section 336(e) election should be made by the seller and the target
corporation jointly in a time and manner generally consistent with what Section 338
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by the party disposing of the target corporation stock, the preamble to the
proposed regulations explicitly assumes that the acquirers will be able to
protect their own interests by bargaining with the party disposing of the
target corporation stock. 77
III. COASE AND EFFECTIVE TAx BARGAINING

All of the forgoing explicit elections create opportunities for bargaining
among private parties, and the details of these elections, discussed above,
create the parameters and incentives for the bargaining. Drawing on the law
and economics literature regarding private bargaining, this section will
discuss the ability of these parties to reach efficient bargains among
themselves about whether to make a tax election. Specifically, this section
will apply the Coase Theorem to this tax bargaining, will discuss
impediments to effective bargaining, and will argue that tax policymakers
should be concerned about these impediments.
A. The CoaseanApproach
The Coase Theorem postulates that "in a regime of zero transaction
costs, . . . negotiations between the parties would lead to those
arrangements being made which would maximize wealth and this
irrespective of the initial assignment of rights." 78 As applied to the types of
explicit tax elections described above, 79 this would mean that, in the
absence of transactions costs, rational taxpayers would bargain effectively
and reach an agreement about whether to make the election based on the
choice that best reduces their total aggregate tax burden. This would be true
provides."); see also infra Part V.C (arguing that the section 336(e) election should be made
jointly). While neither the target corporation nor the parties acquiring the target corporation
stock are required to consent to the election, the electing party must provide a copy of the
election to the target corporation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.336-2(h), 73 Fed. Reg. 49965-02
(Aug. 25, 2008).
See 73 Fed. Reg. 49965-02, 49970 (Aug. 25, 2008) ("[T]he distributees' interests
should generally be protected because of the distributing corporation's fiduciary
responsibilities to its shareholders. In the case of a sale or exchange, the purchasers should
be able to protect their interests in any purchase contract.").
78 R. H. Coase, The InstitutionalStructure of Production,82 AM. EcoN. REV. 713, 717
(1992) (accepting George Stigler's formulation of the theorem that bears Coase's name); see
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Social
Cost].
79
See supra Part II.
8o Unless otherwise stated, this article assumes that taxpayers measure utility in
dollars.
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regardless of the assignment of initial rights - that is, regardless of how
the power to make the election is allocated among the taxpayers and
regardless of the default rule.
The agreement to exercise the election in a way that best minimizes the
parties' aggregate tax burden would be efficient, at least as between the
parties to the agreement. 8 The tax-reducing agreement between the parties
might be efficient (as between the parties) in the Pareto optimal sense,82
where the parties' individual preferences83 are aligned. For example, a
section 338(h)(10) election in connection with the acquisition of a target
corporation with appreciated assets might make the buyer corporation better
off because the target corporation gets a stepped-up basis in its assets. At
the same time, the election also might make the seller corporation better off
if less total gain would be recognized (e.g., if the target corporation's basis
in its assets significantly exceeds the seller corporation's basis in its target
corporation stock), while no party to the agreement is made worse off. Even
if an agreement to make an election is not Pareto optimal as between the
directly affected taxpayers, the election may be efficient (again, as between
the parties) in the Kaldor-Hicks sense.84 For example, an agreement to
allow a noncustodial parent (rather than the custodial parent) to take the
dependency exemption for a child likely makes the custodial parent worse
off (because she must now pay more tax). However, the noncustodial parent
may be so much better off (because he is in a higher tax bracket, so the
value of the dependency exemption to him is higher) that he may be willing
to compensate the custodial parent for her increased tax bill, thereby
Of course, an agreement that minimizes the aggregate tax burden of the contracting
parties reduces revenue to the fisc. This may or may not be efficient overall depending on
whether the private parties can put the funds to more productive use than the government
could have. See infra notes 82 and 84, 179. Part III.C will discuss the impact of these taxminimizing agreements on the fisc and the taxpayers who are not party to the agreement.
82 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 16-17, 48 (4th ed. 2004).
This could be described, at best, as weakly Pareto efficient because this example does not
take into account the impact of the election on the fisc. Of course, to the extent that
taxpayers bargain to make an election that reduces their aggregate tax burden, the fisc is
negatively impacted, thereby reducing funds available for the general public. Taking the
general public into account, the election described in the text accompanying this footnote
could not be Pareto optimal. At best, it could be efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense,
assuming that the parties to the transaction are made so much better off by their reduced tax
burden that they could compensate the general public for the loss suffered.
8 When I say "individual preference," I mean the particular taxpayer's preference
setting aside the possibility of bargaining and in the absence of any compensating payment.
84 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 82. This election may or may not be efficient in the
Kaldor-Hicks sense if, in addition to taking account of the impact of the election on the
directly affected taxpayers, the analysis also takes the general public into account.
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ensuring that she is not worse off on net. 85
In the absence of transaction costs, rational taxpayers should be able to
reach these efficient agreements about whether to make elections without
regard to whether the tax law provides that the election is exercised
unilaterally by one taxpayer or the other, or whether the tax law requires
joint action, and without regard to the default tax treatment that would
apply in the absence of the election. Of course, Coase stresses that
transaction costs are often large and must be taken into account. 86Tax
planning via explicit elections, however, may have lower transaction costs
than other types of tax planning. This is because explicit elections, by
definition, do not require the parties to alter their non-tax legal or economic
arrangements in order to change their tax treatment; the parties merely need
to fill out a form and submit the form to the Service in order to choose their
desired tax treatment.87 Nevertheless, there may be significant impediments
to parties' abilities to exercise the election in the way that best minimizes
their overall tax burden.
B. Impediments to Effective Bargaining
Transaction costs, cognitive biases, and other irrational behavior may
impede taxpayers' abilities to reach tax-minimizing agreements about how
to exercise tax elections. The impact of these impediments varies based on
the context for the election. As will be discussed further below, the
impediments are often (but not always) quite different in the divorce
context than they are in the corporate acquisition context, with the
employment context generally providing an example in the middle.
1. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs can be divided functionally into "information costs,"
"get-together costs," and "decision and execution costs."89 Each will be
The release of the dependency exemption cannot be explicitly
contingent upon
increased child support payments. However, a custodial parent can effectively make the
release of the dependency exemption contingent on the payment of additional support by
declining to provide the release until after the additional support is paid.
86 See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 78, at 15-19.
87 See Field, supra note 11, at 22 (defining explicit
elections).
88 For an interesting discussion about the bargaining
dynamic in the context of divorce,
see, for example, Zelder, supra note 22.
89 Robert C. Ellickson, The Casefor Coase and Against "Coaseansism", 99 YALE L.J.
611, 615 (1989). These categories overlap to some degree. Further, there are other ways to
categorize transaction costs, including chronologically, but I think the functional division is
85
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discussed in turn.
a. Information Costs
Asymmetric and/or imperfect information may pose a significant
barrier to bargaining about whether a tax election should be made. 90
Information costs include the cost of acquiring information about the law,
information about the facts, and information about the value of the election
to the affected parties.
(1) Information About the Law
Taxpayers must be familiar enough with the tax law to know about the
availability of the election and about the election's tax consequences.
Taxpayers often differ in their level of sophistication and knowledge of the
tax law, so it is likely that they will need good tax advisors to inform them
about the availability of the election (and hence the opportunity for
bargaining).
Taxpayers may have high barriers to knowledge about the law,
particularly in the context of divorce. Not all divorce lawyers are
sophisticated tax planners, so they may not be as able to advise the
divorcing spouses about the elections regarding the dependency exemption
and alimony that could provide for opportunities to minimize taxes through
private bargaining. Moreover, there may be a disparity between the
divorcing spouses as to their relative financial sophistication and access to
tax-savvy advisors,91 and divorcing spouses are increasingly representing
themselves. 92 Further, opportunities to engage in tax minimizing bargaining
most useful for understanding how transaction costs can impede bargaining in the tax
election context.
90 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51
ARiz. L. REV. 633, 638 (2009) ("The literature on the Coase Theorem continues to treat
imperfect information as one of the more serious causes of high transaction costs that hinder
bargaining."); Ellickson, supra note 89, at 615.
91 Lenore J. Weitzman, Gender Differences in Custody Bargaining in the United
States, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 395-

406 (Lenore J. Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds., 1992) (discussing concerns about
"[b]argaining [l]everage, [e]conomic [v]ulnerability, and [f]ack of [i]nformation" for
divorcing women).
92 See Judith G. McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do We Need a Lawyer?: An
Empirical Study of Divorce Cases, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 57 (2010), available at
http://ssrn.comabstract-1580243. McMullen and Oswald do note that divorcing spouses
"tended to employ attorneys when certain factors, such as minor children, . . . or higher
husband's income, made the divorce more complex." Id. at 59. Thus, divorcing spouses are
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may arise years after the divorce is finalized (e.g., if a change in
circumstances might make it beneficial for them to switch the allocation of
the dependency exemption); the divorced spouses may not have any tax
advisor at that time to make them aware of the election and the bargaining
opportunity.
In contrast, where taxpayers tend to be relatively sophisticated and
well-advised, as in the context of large corporate acquisitions where a
regular section 338 election or a section 338(h)(10) election might be made,
taxpayers are likely to be able to obtain the necessary information about the
tax law from their tax advisors, albeit at a high hourly billing rate.
Similarly, sophisticated tax advisors may also be able to inform their
corporate clients about the availability and consequences of a section 336(e)
election. But, given that section 336(e) has effectively been nonoperational
for many years in the absence of implementing regulations (which have
only been recently proposed), clients and even savvy lawyers may have less
familiarity with this election.
(2) Information about the Facts
Taxpayers (and their advisors) may also lack the factual information to
realize that the election could be relevant to the situation. Without this
information, they may not even realize that there is an opportunity to
bargain about whether an election will be made.
In the divorce and employment contexts, knowledge of the facts may
not be particularly problematic. Divorcing spouses know that they are
getting divorced. 93 Similarly, both the employer and the employee generally
know if restricted property is being transferred by the employer to the
employee in compensation for services.
In contrast, in multi-step corporate acquisitions, some small parties
may lack information about what larger set of related transactions might be
occurring. For example, in a QSP for which a regular section 338 election
can be made, the buyer corporation may purchase the target stock from a
large number of disparate sellers in a series of separate transactions over a
twelve-month period. 94 Thus, while the buyer corporation may have a plan

more likely to retain lawyers in the situations where the dependency allocation election
and/or the alimony election may be available, but even in these circumstances, a significant
number of divorcing spouses (in the study sample, between 30-40% of divorcing spouses
with minor children) proceeded pro se. Id. at 72-73, 80-81.
93
They may not know the tax law implications of these facts, but surely they know the
facts.
94 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
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to acquire more than 80% of the stock of the target corporation, each selling
shareholder, particularly the shareholders who sell early on, may have no
idea that the sale of their stock is part of a transaction to which a regular
section 338 election could apply. Where the target corporation is a foreign
corporation, the selling shareholders that would be affected by the regular
section 338 election will ultimately receive notice from the buyer
corporation if there has been an election, but this information will only be
received after the election has been made, and thus after the bargaining
opportunity has likely passed.
Similarly, in a QSD for which a section 336(e) election can be made,
the stock disposition can be made to a huge number of disparate parties in a
95
series of separate transactions over a twelve-month period. Thus, an
individual shareholder who acquires a small amount of the target
corporation stock may not be aware of the overall disposition plan, so he
may not even realize that a section 336(e) election is a possibility, even if
he is aware of the law. As a result, he may unintentionally forego the
opportunity to negotiate about whether the election will be made.
(3) Valuation Information
Additionally, in order to assess the potential value of bargaining about
and making an election, taxpayers need to have sufficient information both
about their own tax situation and about the tax situation of the other party
affected by the election. This may require taxpayers to estimate their own
tax and financial situation for the current and future years.
For example, in the divorce context, each taxpayer must estimate his or
her expected future income and tax burden in order to value the potential
benefit of the available elections. The difficulty of making this estimate
depends on the taxpayer's individual circumstances (e.g., does the taxpayer
have a steady salaried job or is the taxpayer self-employed or compensated
on commission, such that the taxpayer's income may vary markedly year to
year?). That said, in the divorce context, the parties, if they cooperate,
generally can switch their choices from year to year to accommodate
changing circumstances. In the employment context, the employee must
project the extent to which the transferred property will increase (or
decrease) in value and must assess the likelihood that he will ultimately
receive the property without forfeiture. Again, these projections may be
difficult depending on the circumstances, and there is significant pressure
on getting these projections right given that the section 83(b) election

9

See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
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generally cannot be changed in the future if the projections turn out to be
incorrect.
Valuation can also be an issue in the context of one of the corporate
acquisition elections, where a party disposing of corporate stock will need
to be able to compare the tax cost of the transaction if an election is made to
the tax cost of the transaction if the election is not made. This may be fairly
easy since taxpayers should know their stock basis and corporations should
know their bases in their assets; nevertheless, someone must be paid to
collect this information and perform these calculations. Value estimation
may be slightly more difficult for the acquirer in a corporate acquisition; an
acquirer will need to have a sense about future income projections in order
to estimate how valuable any stepped-up basis (and hence, increased
depreciation deductions) will be.
In addition to the foregoing, assuming that each taxpayer can determine
the value of the election to him/her/itself, the taxpayer must also attempt to
estimate the value (or cost) of the election to the other party affected by the
election. That task may be hard without the revelation of private
information about the tax and financial status of the other party.
b.

Get-Together Costs

Transaction costs can also include "get-together costs," which
Professor Robert Ellickson defines as "the burdens of arranging physical
and electronic connections among transacting parties. They include the
costs of establishing lines of communications, setting up meetings, and
transporting parties and goods."96 The magnitude of these costs likely
depends on whether the parties are already engaged in bargaining, how
many parties are involved, and how many separate transactions and separate
elections are involved.
In the context of bargaining about tax elections, get-together costs may
be low if the parties are already negotiating. So, for example, where more
than 80% of the stock of a target corporation is being acquired, the seller(s)
and the acquirer(s) are likely to be engaged in extensive negotiations about
various aspects of the transaction.9 7 Thus, there should only be a marginal
additional cost for getting together to negotiate about whether to make a
section 338(h)(10) election, given that there is generally a single corporate
purchaser buying more than 80% of the stock from a single corporate

Ellickson, supra note 89.
97 See, e.g., GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 56, at $$ 2100-2600 (providing sample
acquisition agreements).
96
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seller.98 Similarly, when an employer is granting restricted property to an
employee in connection with the performance of services, the employer and
employee are likely bargaining about the amount of property, the
restrictions to which the property is subject, and the conditions of
employment, among other things. Thus, there may be relatively low
additional cost for the parties to get together to discuss whether a section
83(b) election will be made.
Get-together costs may increase somewhat as the number of parties
involved in the transaction increases. For example, in a transaction to which
a regular section 338 election may apply, there may be multiple sellers of
target corporation stock, 99 and in a transaction to which a section 336(e)
election may apply, there may be multiple buyers/acquirers of target
corporation stock.'oo Of course, if the purchases from multiple sellers (or
the sales to multiple buyers) occur as part of a single integrated transaction,
the multiple sellers (or multiple buyers, as the case may be) are generally
represented at the negotiating table by agents acting on behalf of all of them
(e.g., officers of the target company or representatives of the purchasing
group). Just as those agents negotiate representations, warranties, and
covenants, etc., on behalf of the multiple sellers (or multiple buyers), those
agents should be able to represent the interests of their principals in the
negotiation about whether an election should be made. As a result, the
increase in the number of parties involved in the transaction may not
significantly increase the get-together costs associated with negotiating over
whether a corporate acquisition election will be made.' 0
Get-together costs may be increasingly problematic when there are
multiple separate transactions. Then, taxpayers must get together to
negotiate when they might not otherwise have already been engaged in
bargaining with each other. For example, consider a single corporation that
purchases ten percent of the target corporation stock from each of ten
different shareholders in separate transactions over a period of ten months;
the buyer corporation could make a regular section 338 election in
connection with this acquisition. However, although the buyer corporation
negotiates with each individual seller, the separate sellers are not
represented by a single agent in the negotiations and the sellers may not be
cooperating with each other in their negotiations with the buyer
corporation.102 Thus, there may be significant costs associated with getting
98

See supra Part II.C.

99 See supra Part II.C.

1oo See supra Part II.C.
101 But see infra Part Ill.B.l.c (noting that execution costs may increase significantly).
102Even if the different sellers are informed about the series of transactions, there is
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all of the sellers together to negotiate with the buyer about whether the
regular section 338 election will be made.
Get-together may be most costly where the election is made not just
once (as with the corporate acquisition elections), but potentially every year
(as with elections in the divorce context) when the parties might not
otherwise be negotiating each year. Of course, divorcing spouses are likely
to be engaged in negotiation when they first get divorced. At that time,
they can reach an agreement about how they want alimony to be treated for
tax purposes and about how the dependency exemption will be allocated.
To the extent that their circumstances change over time, however, and the
original agreement does not best minimize their aggregate taxes, the former
spouses would need to reconvene in order to agree to change their
election.1 03 This renegotiation may need to occur at a time when the parties
might not otherwise be in communication. This could create potentially
significant get-together costs even if the parties are completely rational,
which they often are not, particularly in situations like divorce that can be
fraught with emotion and complex interpersonal power dynamics.
c.

Decision & Execution Costs

Parties must also decide how they wish to proceed, and they must
formalize their agreement. 104 If the parties have sufficient information, the
costs of deciding what to do may be minimal. This is likely to be true even
if "a transacting party is either a nonhicrarchical group of two or more
persons who must coordinate together or a hierarchical organization with a
multi-person decision-making structure[,]'o assuming that the parties are
acting rationally and the value of the election can be reduced to a monetary
figure.
Execution costs include the costs of documenting the agreement and
completing the relevant forms necessary to make the election.106
Documenting the agreement likely entails a relatively minimal cost if the
still a collective action problem to overcome.
103 The parties might also need to get together
every year if the custodial parent is only
willing to release the dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent on a year-by-year
basis, in part to give her additional leverage to collect child support payments. See Larry
Maples, Divorce Agreement Language, 198 J. OF ACCT. 25, 29 (2004) (recommending a
year-by-year release of the dependency exemption).
See Ellickson, supra note 89, at 615 ("Decision and execution costs are the costs,
apart from information costs, that parties who have gotten tougher incur to actualize their
agreement.").
s
106

Id
See id.
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parties are already negotiating about other matters; thus, these costs likely
mirror get-together costs. 107 Further, the process of making a tax election is
relatively straightforward because it generally just involves the completion
of a form with basic information about the transaction and the parties.los
As the number of parties required to sign the election form increases,
however, the execution of a tax election can become more complex and
thus more costly. This is particularly true if a company representative
negotiates and executes the acquisition agreement but the individual
shareholders must actually execute the tax election.109
2.

Cognitive Biases

Even in the absence of transaction costs, taxpayers may not behave
perfectly rationally, which may inhibit their abilities to reach taxminimizing bargains about whether to make elections. Building on the work
of cognitive psychologists,1 10 behavioral law and economics scholars
suggest that analyses of law should take into account the systematic ways in
which people deviate from ideal concepts of rational decision-making.
These cognitive biases impose "bounds" on rational human behavior and
may impede taxpayers from reaching tax-minimizing agreements about
whether to make tax elections. Specifically, when trying to bargain about
whether to make a tax election, taxpayers could be affected by (a) framing,
(b) status quo bias, the endowment effect, and overall "stickiness" of legal
entitlements, and (c) anchoring, among other possible cognitive biases.
a. Framing
"Framing refers to the effect whereby the same question or choice set,

107 See supra Part III.B. I.b.
1os The election forms do vary in complexity. See, e.g., PRACTITIONERS PUBL'G
CO.,

TAX ELECTIONs DESKBOOK (11th ed. 2005) (detailing the technical requirements for
completing and filing a variety of elections).
109 For example, this could occur if an S corporation is acquired in a reverse triangular
merger. A representative of the S corporation would sign the acquisition agreement on behalf
of the company that is participating in the merger. However, in order to make a section
338(h)(10) election with respect to that acquisition, each individual S corporation
shareholder must sign the election form.
110 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).

See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 passim (1998).
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described differently, can lead to different answers.",112 Concerns about
framing highlight the importance of both the allocation of the power to
make the tax election and the default rule that is applicable in the absence of
an election.
Specifically, a joint election frames the choice as a joint decision that
requires cooperation. For example, the joint action required to opt out of the
default treatment of alimony requires both former spouses to consent
together. 113 In contrast, a unilateral election frames the question as a choice
that belongs solely to the taxpayer who is empowered by the tax law to
make the election, thereby altering the power dynamic between the
taxpayers. 14 For example, in the section 83(b) election, the tax law vests in
the employee, alone, the power to choose how his receipt of restricted
property will be treated for tax purposes. This frames the choice as
belonging to the employee, even though the employer may have an interest
in participating in joint decision-making.1 5 Even corporate transactions
may be influenced by these cognitive biases,ll6 although possibly to a lesser
extent than individuals. For example, a section 338(h)(10) election is
designed as a joint election and is thus framed as requiring cooperation; in
contrast a regular section 338 election can be made unilaterally by the buyer
corporation, which frames the choice as belonging to the buyer and not the
seller(s). The framing effect, however, may not be particularly powerful in
corporate acquisition elections given the likely involvement of sophisticated
tax planners, who may be able to help businesspeople overcome this
framing effect.
Additionally, default rules frame each tax election in a particular way.
For example, the election regarding the tax treatment of alimony effectively

112 Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB.

POL'Y & L. 106, 108 (2006) (citations omitted).
See supra Part II.A. I. The framing of the dependency exemption presents an
interesting hybrid case. The custodial parent is vested with the unilateral power to release the
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent. Even though joint action is required in
that the noncustodial parent must attach the release form to his tax return, the fact that the tax
law gives the custodial parent sole power to keep or release the dependency exemption
frames the choice as belonging primarily to the custodial parent. See supra Part II.A.2.
114 See Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60
SMIU L. REV. 383, 393-94 (2007) (discussing how the power dynamic between parties can
be affected by the rules that affect the way in which parties can opt out of a default rule).
115 See Knoll, supra note
48, at 726.
Cf John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups:
Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 362-64 (2000) (suggesting that even
sophisticated businessmen acting on behalf of their businesses could be affected by
psychological biases, including the endowment effect). But see infra note 120.

Virginia Tax Review

32

[Vol. 3 1:1

currently asks the payor whether (and in exchange for how much) he is
willing to "give up" the deduction that he would otherwise get for the
payment of alimony. The payor might respond differently if the default rule
was reversed, such that the election would effectively ask the payor if (and
in exchange for how much) he would be willing to pay in order to receive a
deduction for alimony payments that would otherwise be nondeductible.
b.

Status Quo Bias, the Endowment Effect, & "Stickiness"

Another bias that is commonly discussed in the literature is the "status
quo bias," which suggests "individuals tend to prefer the present state of the
world to alternative states, all other things being equal." 117 This concept
highlights the importance of the choice of default rule. To the extent that
parties are affected by a status quo bias, the tax treatment specified by a
default rule may be entrenched, even if the parties might be able to agree to
elect an alternative that better minimizes their overall tax burden. For this
reason and many others, a default rule may be "sticky." 118
A related, though slightly narrower, concept is the "endowment effect,"
that is, "the principal that people tend to value goods more when they own
them than when they do not." 1l9 Taxpayers affected by the endowment
effect may value a particular tax entitlement, such as the dependency
exemption, more than its objective fair market value just because of the
initial allocation of that entitlement. Further, it is possible that, for example,
a custodial parent could equate her initial entitlement to the dependency
exemption with her relationship with her child, which might make her
disinclined to release the exemption even if the noncustodial parent pays
her more than the exemption would otherwise be worth to her.
Nevertheless, while the status quo bias may make the default treatment
"sticky," the endowment effect may not have much influence with respect
to tax elections, given that these tax bargaining focal point elections are
often made by businesspeople acting as agents for othersl20 and given that

117 Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.

1227, 1228-29 (2003).
118 Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 651 passim (2006) (exploring the "stickiness" of default rules).
119 Korobkin, supra note 117; see also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard
H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSP.
193, 194-97 (1991).
120 Korobkin, supra note 117, at 1279 (citing Jennifer Arlen, Matthew L. Spitzer, &
Eric L. Talley, Endowment Effects Within CorporateAgency Relationships, J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 33).
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most tax entitlements can be reduced to their monetary values. 121In
contrast, taxpayers who are less sophisticated, less knowledgeable, and less
wealthy may be even more susceptible to the variety of issues that lead to
stickiness. 122
Additional issues that are related to (or possibly explanatory of) the
endowment effect can also make initial allocations of rights sticky.
Specifically, the legal framework can have a signaling or "legitimating
effect, carrying important information about what most people are expected
to do."l23 Further, stickiness may also be largely a product of
.124
procrastination or inertia.
c.

Anchoring

The concept of "anchoring" has been described as "the tendency for
people to make decisions based on an initial estimate that is later adjusted,
but not sufficiently to eliminate the influence of the initial estimate." 12 5 In
particular, this bias may affect taxpayers' decisions with respect to tax
elections that can be made year after year in succession, such as the election
regarding the allocation of the dependency exemption between divorced
parents. Taxpayers may make a tax-minimizing decision regarding the
allocation of the dependency exemption in the first year, but they may not
accurately take account of changed circumstances in subsequent years in
assessing how to allocate the dependency exemption. Thus, they may
continue to allocate the dependency exemption in the manner first agreed
upon even if that approach is no longer the tax-minimizing decision.
Similarly, if a service provider receives restricted property in connection
with the performance of services for multiple years in a row, he may decide
to make the same decision regarding the section 83(b) election for later
property grants as he made with respect to earlier property grants, even if
circumstances have changed such that the original choice is not taxminimizing with respect to the later grants.
121 See Cass Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule,
77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 106, 109 n.10

(2002) (citing Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics 169, at 176 (1991) for the
proposition that "endowment effect might be small or nonexistent . .. if legal entitlements
are ... akin to money tokens.").
122
Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of its
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1031, 1060 (2004).
123 Sunstein, supra note 121, at
109.
124 See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian
Paternalism is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv 1159, 1181 (2003).
125 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 724 (2003).
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Sheer Irrationality

Even setting aside transaction costs and systemic biases that lead to
bounded rationality, there is a risk that parties will behave quite irrationally
(assuming again that utility is measured in money) and therefore will not be
willing to enter into efficient agreements. This is less likely to be a problem
in the context of a corporate acquisition because the value of the election is
likely to be reducible to a monetary value and businesspeople are generally
focused on the bottom-line. Similarly, in the employment context,
employees and employers may be likely to measure utility in money and try
to extract as much value as possible from an agreement.
In contrast, divorce can be fraught with great emotion and animus. As a
result, divorcing spouses may be more inclined to act in a way that does not
maximize his/her economic wealth, as a result of spite, fear, anger or other
emotional reaction to the situation. For example, a divorced custodial parent
may not be willing to release a dependency exemption and thus may be
willing to forego additional compensation, just to prevent the noncustodial
spouse from receiving the benefit of using the dependency exemption.
Thus, emotion can impede parties from reaching tax-minimizing
agreements about whether to make a tax election. This would be irrational if
utility is measured in money, but could also be characterized as rational if
welfare/utility is measured not in money, but also in emotion.126
C. Impediments to BargainingMean that Election ParametersMatter
The various impediments to bargaining described above may prevent
some taxpayers from reaching tax-minimizing decisions about tax elections.
Of course, when taxpayers do not act to best minimize their taxes, more
127
So then, query, why at a time of
revenue is collected for the fisc.
significant federal budget deficits, policymakers should be concerned about

126 That is, it could be perfectly rational for a custodial parent not to release the
dependency exemption if the sum of (1) the monetary value of the exemption to her and (2)
the emotional value to her of preventing the noncustodial parent from using the exemption
exceeds the value of the dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent. See generally
Katharine B. Silbaugh, Money as Emotion in the Distribution of Wealth at Divorce, in
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 234, 235 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006), available at

http://ssrun.com/abstract_id=976354 (It is "impossibl[e to...] exclud[e] nonfinancial
matters from consideration [in dividing wealth accumulated during a marriage], as
nonfinancial matters become masked as financial ones.").
127 See Field, supra note 11, at 31 ("[A] well-advised rational taxpayer will almost
always exercise the election in a way that minimizes its tax liability, at the expense of the
fisc.").
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taxpayers' inability to reach tax-minimizing agreements.
There are several answers. If policymakers have seen fit to provide a
tax election for good reason, 128 then the benefits of that election should be
available to all sets of taxpayers and not merely to the sophisticated or welladvised taxpayers who can overcome the impediments to reaching a taxminimizing bargain.129 Admittedly, this concern may be less compelling in
some contexts (like corporate acquisitions) and more compelling in other
contexts (like divorce),130 especially given the size of the possible disparity
in sophistication, financial resources, and power of the relevant parties.
Further, sometimes the ability of taxpayers to bargain is a premise
underlying policymakers' decisions about whether to provide an election
and what the parameters of the election should be. For example, part of the
policy reason for providing the election regarding the tax treatment of
alimony was Congress's desire to try to facilitate negotiation among the
taxpayers.131 Similarly, one of the reasons for the provision of the election
with respect to the transfer of restricted property in compensation for
services was "to add flexibility" for the taxpayers.132 If the design of the
election hinders precisely the negotiation that Congress is trying to
facilitate, the election parameters should be revised in order to better
achieve the goal. Another example involves one of the corporate acquisition
elections - when designing the parameters for the section 336(e) election,
policymakers explicitly relied on the ability of the taxpayers to bargain
about whether the election will be made.133 If there was a mistake in the
See id. at 33-66 (describing how explicit elections can be useful
as tools in the
design of the federal income tax); see also supra notes 16-17. As noted in the introduction,
this article generally sets aside the issue of whether the provision of an election is a wise
policy choice. Instead, the discussion herein generally accepts the elections as part of the
federal income tax system, and seeks to understand, reflect upon, and provide guidance
about how to change these elections.
129 This concern is related to the concept of "equal planning under law," as used in the
inheritance context. See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L.
REv. 611, 613 (1988).
130 This difference goes more to the magnitude of the concerns and the benefit to be
gained from addressing the concerns, than it does to the existence of the concerns.
11 See Moran, supra note 23, at 148 ("Over and over again, the 1984 reform shows: (1)
an increased emphasis on couples engaging in tax planning as a unit."); see also, e.g.,
Patricia G. Lewis & Julie W. Davis, Act Alters Tax Provisions For Divorcing Couples,
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 27, 1984, at 19 (The "Conference Committee provisions appear to be a
compromise between eliminating the alimony deduction [altogether] and providing a 'private
ordering' system as proposed initially by the ABA Tax Section.").
132 S. REP. No. 91-552, at 2154
(1969).
1 See 73 Fed. Reg. 49965-02, 49970 (Aug. 25, 2008) (explaining,
in support of the
conclusion that the election should be made unilaterally by the corporation disposing of the
128
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assumptions regarding taxpayers' abilities to protect themselves through
effective bargaining, then the election parameters might need to be revised.
Moreover, regardless of whether taxpayers are able to bargain
effectively, the design of the election and the allocation of the initial rights
associated with the election can have distributional consequences.1 34 For
example, the fact that a custodial parent has the power to decide whether to
use a dependency exemption or to release it to the noncustodial parent
means that, to get the custodial parent to release the dependency exemption,
the noncustodial parent is likely to have to share with the custodial parent
some of the benefits of the reallocation of that dependency exemption. In
contrast, if the power to decide which parent was entitled to the exemption
was vested solely in the noncustodial parent, the custodial parent would
have little or no leverage to share in part of the value of that exemption.135
Similarly, the fact that the default rule for the tax treatment of alimony
favors the payorl36 means that the recipient has little or no leverage to push
the payor to share part of the value of the deduction. In contrast, if the
default rule was reversed (so that the default treatment favored the
recipient ), the payor would likely have to share with the recipient some
portion of the tax benefit that the payor would receive from opting out of

target corporation stock, "[i]n the case of a sale or exchange, the purchasers should be able to
protect their interests in any purchase contract").
134 As mentioned earlier, it is possible that parties will reach cooperative bargains
without regard to the underlying legal rules, meaning that the legal parameters for the
election are unlikely to have significant distributional consequences. See ELLICKSON, supra
note 18. Bargaining without reference to the law, however, is relatively unlikely in the tax
election context because, here, the only thing that is the subject of the bargain is the tax
treatment of a particular action, and tax itself is merely a product of law. That said, divorce is
the likeliest context where parties might coordinate their affairs without regard to the tax
laws that govern their agreement. In such a case, the tax election parameters might not
matter, except to the extent that private agreements may be informed by social norms, and
those social norms may be influenced by the law's allocation of entitlements.
13 In the corporate acquisition context, the fact that the section 338(h)(10) election
must be made jointly means that the buyer and seller generally must share the tax benefits of
the election. In a corporate acquisition, the buyer or the seller may have more leverage
depending on a variety of factors, including the relative size of the buyer and target
("whales" usually have a lot of leverage when buying "minnows"), and the financial statuses
of the corporations (e.g., whether the target corporation is highly sought after by multiple
prospective buyers or whether the target corporation or the seller is in desperate need of
cash), among other issues.
136 That is, the alimony payor can take a deduction for the alimony paid, and the
alimony recipient must include in income the alimony received.
1 That is, the alimony payor would not be able to take a deduction for alimony paid,
and the alimony recipient would be able to exclude the amount received from her income.
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the default rule.138 Whether or not these reflect the desired distribution of
the tax benefit associated with the election,139 the parameters of the election
can have distributional consequences.
IV. DESIGNING THE ELECTION PARAMETERS TO FACILITATE
TAX BARGAINING

Given the possible welfare, distributional, and administrative
consequences of the parameters of tax elections, policymakers should take
care in the design of those parameters. The key parameters that set the stage
for the private bargaining are (1) the determination of which party or parties
has the power to opt out of the default rule, and (2) the choice of default
rule. 140
Of course, these parameters are necessarily intertwined. For example,
assume that a tax election employs a default rule that confers a tax benefit
on Party A and that opting out would shift the tax benefit to Party B. In that
case, if the power to make the election is allocated to B, then B could
unilaterally take the tax benefit away from A without compensating A. In
contrast, if the power to make the election is allocated to A, then B could
only obtain the tax benefit if A agreed to cede the tax benefit, likely in
exchange for some compensation. If the default rule in this example is
reversed, then the consequences of the allocation of power are also
reversed.
This part will analyze and make recommendations with respect to both
key parameters. As will be discussed further below, policymakers' abilities
to use either or both of these parameters to facilitate bargaining and reduce
bargaining costs depend very heavily on two factors - namely, (a)
whether, and in what circumstances, the individual preferences of the
parties can be systematically identified, 14 1 and (b) in those situations where
1

It is possible, and in some cases likely, that the default tax rules are priced
into the
parties' underlying economic bargain, such that a change in the parameters for an election is
likely to have a modest impact. See infra note 217.
139 For example, two commentators have argued that the seller should be entitled to the
entire amount of the benefit of the election and thus should be able to make the election
unilaterally. Seago & Barkhi, supra note 68, at 1084.
140 There are other parameters too including the details of mechanics for making the
election (what has to go on the form and when the form must be submitted to the Service).
141 By this, I mean an affected taxpayer will virtually always prefer one particular tax
treatment to another rather than having her individual preference depend largely on facts and
circumstances. For example, regardless of the general facts and circumstances, recipients of
alimony systematically prefer to exclude the payment from their income rather than to
include the payment in their income. Note that even where taxpayers' individual preferences
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there are likely to be informational asymmetries between the parties,
whether, and in what circumstances, the identity of the less-informed party
is reasonably determinable.
Despite the connections between the allocation of power to make an
election and the choice of default rule, these parameters merit separate
analysis because the parameters can affect the bargaining dynamic in
different ways and because one parameter may be more effective than the
other for accomplishing policy objectives in particular circumstances. 14 2
Thus, Part IV.A addresses the issue of allocation of power to make an
election, and then, Part IV.B examines how carefully chosen default rules
can help facilitate bargaining and reduce bargaining costs.
Later, Part V will reassemble the parameters and provide
recommendations about how to coordinate the parameters.
A. Allocating the Power to Choose
Regardless of the default rule that would apply in the absence of an
election, this part argues that the tax law should generally require that
multiple taxpayers affected by an explicit election make the election jointly
rather than unilaterally.1 43 Where an explicit tax election affects multiple
taxpayers and thus serves as a focal point for bargaining, joint elections
help taxpayers overcome impediments to bargaining. This is particularly
true in situations where there are likely to be informational asymmetries
between the parties but where it is difficult to determine which party is
vary based on facts and circumstances, there may be limited situations that are identifiable
and definable ex ante in which the individual preferences are determinable. I will generally
refer to individual preferences these contexts as "situationally determinable."
142 Further, the allocation of the power to make the election is an issue that is unique to
elections that affect multiple parties, each of whom could be vested with the power to make
the choice. Elections that directly affect one taxpayer just involve that taxpayer and the
government, in which case that taxpayer is the party that has the power to make the election.
In these cases, there is no other directly affected party with whom that power could be
shared except for the government, and if the government has the power to make the choice
about the tax treatment applicable to the particular situation, there would be no election
available.
In contrast, the issue of default rules is relevant to all tax elections, not just those
elections that serve as focal points for private bargaining. See Field, supra note I1, at 66-69
(discussing default rules for tax elections, in general). As a result, my prior scholarship
spends a little time discussing default rules for tax elections, but the discussion herein
elaborates significantly on my prior work.
143 The allocation of the power to make the tax election could be understood as an
"altering rule" - rules that define what is required in order to opt out of a particular default
rule that has been selected. See McDonnell, supra note 114, at 385.
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likely to be less informed (and thus at risk of opportunistic behavior by the
other party). Thus, joint elections confer many advantages, which can be
especially beneficial if the costs created by joint elections can be
minimized.
1. The Case for a General Preference for Joint Elections
Joint elections can be beneficial because (a) they help to empower the
less-informed taxpayers who may have difficulty protecting themselves
through bargaining, (b) they can take advantage of cognitive biases to
promote cooperation between taxpayers, and (c) they can decrease the risk
of government whipsaw. These potential benefits will be discussed in turn.
a.

Empowering the Less-Informed to Bargain

Joint elections can serve an information-forcing function, incentivizing
more knowledgeable taxpayers to disclose information about the law, about
the facts and about their private valuations. All of that information can help
the less-informed taxpayers make more educated decisions about their tax
treatment and can put them in a position to negotiate more effectively. 144
Specifically, a joint election encourages a party that has better
knowledge of the law (and thus of the availability of the election) to inform
the other party about the availability of the election. The latter party must
still employ its own counsel to get advice about how the law will apply, but
the former party's revelation about the law empowers the latter party to
know to ask counsel about the election. For example, if a noncustodial
parent would like to claim the dependency exemption for a child, he must
involve the custodial parent; absent the query from the noncustodial parent,
the custodial parent may not have even known that there was an option to
reallocate the dependency exemption and to potentially extract additional
support payments from the noncustodial parent.
In addition, a joint election can push the better-informed party to
disclose facts about a larger overall factual plan. In a corporate acquisition
to which a regular section 338 election could apply, a single corporate
purchaser could purchase target corporation stock from a wide variety of
sellers over a twelve month period in a series of separate transactions.1 45 As
discussed above, the regular section 338 election can be made unilaterally
1
This benefit of joint elections depends on there being informational asymmetries
between the parties. Where the parties have roughly equal information, joint elections used
for information-forcing purposes are likely to have very little value.
145 See supra Part H.C.

40

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 3 1:1

by the buyer corporation. Since the buyer's ability to make the election does
not depend on the sellers' participation, the buyer has little incentive to
disclose to the sellers the facts of the overall acquisition plan unless the
sellers specifically ask. In contrast, if a regular section 338 election had to
be made jointly by the buyer and the sellers, a buyer that is purchasing the
stock of a foreign target corporationl46 in a series of transactions over time
would have an incentive to tell the individual sellers about the overall
acquisition plan. That disclosure would be necessary in order for the buyer
corporation to secure the sellers' cooperation in making the election. The
buyer corporation would likely disclose the overall acquisition plan during
each of the original transaction negotiations, and the buyer would likely try
to include a provision in the acquisition contract obligating each individual
seller to participate in making the election. Even if the buyer corporation
does not reveal the overall acquisition plan until after a particular seller's
sale is complete, a joint election would require the buyer corporation to
approach the seller after the acquisition and reenter negotiations in order to
obtain the seller's consent to the election. Either way, a joint election forces
the buyer corporation to reveal to each seller the overall acquisition plan,
which may alert each seller to the possibility that an election could apply to
the transaction. This may enable each such seller to protect himself better
through negotiation.147
Furthermore, when one party approaches another and reveals
information about the facts and/or the law, the opening offer by the first
party helps the other party gain insight into the first party's tax and financial
situation. This reveals some otherwise private information about the value
of the election to the first party, which can help the less-informed party
better price any agreement.
In addition, by giving the less-informed party some power over the tax
choice, joint elections provide an opportunity for that party to better protect
itself through the exercise of that power. That is, the revelation of
information is useful to the less-informed party, but the information may do
that party very little good if that party has limited ability to act on that
information.148 The requirement that a party participate in making an
146 Remember that, generally, a regular section 338 election does not affect the tax
treatment of the sellers, except in limited types of acquisitions of foreign target corporations.
See supra Part I.C.
147 The analysis of the allocation of power for section 336(e) elections is quite similar to
that described here for section 338.
148 Conceivably, the less-informed party could act on the information (and thereby try
to protect itself) by negotiating with the other party. But, absent decision-making power
vested by law, the less-informed party's primary tool for negotiation is money. The less-
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election helps to prevent another party from imposing adverse
consequences on the first party without its consent. For example, the
election to change the allocation of the dependency exemption requires joint
action by both former spouses; the participation of the custodial parent in
this choice prevents the noncustodial parent from taking the dependency
exemption away from the custodial parent without the custodial parent's
consent. In contrast, the fact that the regular section 338 election can be
made unilaterally by the buyer corporation means that certain sellers of
stock in a foreign corporation could be subjected to adverse tax
consequences without their consent if the buyer corporation decides to
make the election. Of course, the opportunity to be involved in the decisionmaking process does not guarantee that taxpayers will be able to effectively
protect themselves and negotiate toward efficient bargains, as taxpayers
may make uneducated or ill-advised decisions. The legally established
entitlement to participate in the choice does, however, give the at-risk
taxpayers an additional tool to help protect themselves.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, unilateral elections could serve many
of these information-forcing and self-protection functions, if the moreinformed party can be clearly identified. That is, if the default rules could
be constructed to always disfavor the more-informed party and always favor
the less-informed taxpayer, and if the latter taxpayer had the unilateral
power to make the relevant election, the more-informed party would be
incentivized to reveal information about the law, facts, and valuation in
order to entice the first party to make the election.149 In that situation, the
election could not be exercised in a way that harms the less-informed
taxpayer without that taxpayer's consent.
However, clear identification of the less-informed party can be
difficult, meaning that, in such cases, a unilateral election is unlikely to be
particularly effective for protecting the less-informed party (whoever that
informed party could pay the other party in order to induce that other party to make the
election choice that is more favorable to the less-informed party. To the extent there is a
correlation between possession of information and possession of wealth, the less-informed
party may not have sufficient funds to protect itself by compensating the other party. Hence,
using the law to vest power in the less-informed party gives that party another tool to use in
the negotiation - legally mandated consent.
149 Note that this approach also requires the clear identification of which tax treatment
favors that more vulnerable party. While some generalizations can be made about
preferences for default rules, taxpayers' preferred tax treatments often vary with the
taxpayers' individual tax situations. Thus, even if the less-informed party can be identified
with a high degree of certainty, it can sometimes be difficult to determine which default rule
disfavors the more-informed party; as a result, an effective information-forcing unilateral
election may be difficult to design. See supra Part IV.B.
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may be). For example, in the context of the dependency exemption, query
whether the custodial or noncustodial parent is likely to be less-informed;
the noncustodial parent may be a sophisticated primary breadwinner (in
which case the custodial parent is likely less-informed), 5 0 an ignorant
deadbeat' 5 (in which case the custodial parent is likely more-informed), or
something in between. Thus, in this type of situation, where the
identification of the less-informed party is subject to significant uncertainty,
a joint election can be particularly valuable. This is because the joint
election ensures that the less-informed party (whoever it may be) always
has a right to participate in the choice, meaning that the more-informed
party will be incentivized to reveal information if it wants the election to be
made.152 Further, even where an information-forcing unilateral election can
be used to empower the less-informed party to bargain, this unilateral
approach requires that the more-informed taxpayer's individual preference
be systematically determinable, which is often not the case.153
Additionally, the use of a unilateral election foregoes some of the other
benefits of joint elections discussed below.
b.

Leveraging Cognitive Biases to FacilitateCooperation

Joint elections can also take advantage of cognitive biases by framing
the decision as a joint choice rather than as an individual one. This framing
may help to set up the choice as one on which the parties should cooperate,
and this may be particularly useful for elections, like the election regarding
the tax treatment of alimony, where part of the goal in providing the
election is to facilitate cooperative tax planning among taxpayers. That
election requires the affirmative consent of both former spouses in order to
change the tax treatment of alimony, and that consent generally needs to be

150 For example, where one parent was a stay-at-home parent with primary childcare
responsibilities and one parent was the primary breadwinner, primary custody may be
assigned to the former because she has a closer personal relationship with the child.
Assuming a correlation between high levels of income and high levels of information (or
access thereto), the custodial parent is likely to be less informed than the noncustodial
parent.
Is1 For example, primary custody may be assigned to a particular parent because that
parent has greater ability to provide for the child and/or because the noncustodial parent is
unavailable or unable to care for themselves or the child. Assuming again a correlation
between high levels of income and high levels of information (or access thereto), the
custodial parent in this situation is likely to be more informed than the noncustodial parent.
152 Of course, as discussed further below, this approach does put increased pressure on
the choice of default rule. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the choice of default rules).
15 See infra Part IV.B.

2011]

Tax Elections & Private Bargaining

43

provided in a single agreement that is negotiated, prepared, and signed
through joint effort.
The election regarding the allocation of the dependency exemption
does not use the framing heuristic quite as successfully. Although the
election requires joint action (in that the noncustodial parent must attach to
his tax return the custodial parent's release of the exemption), the election
does not frame the choice as a joint decision. Rather, the tax law empowers
the custodial parent to have control over the choice; the decision to release
the exemption belongs to the custodial parent, and in order to effectuate the
release, only the custodial parent's signature is required on the release form.
This frames the decision more like an individual choice belonging to the
custodial parent, which may not facilitate cooperation as clearly as the
framing in the alimony election. If policymakers want to promote
cooperative tax planning among divorced parents of dependent children,154
the election could be rewritten to clearly require joint decision-making and
not merely joint action.155
A joint election also serves, at least in part, to split the original
endowment between the multiple parties because neither party has the sole
power to make the tax choice. This division of power between multiple
parties divides the legal entitlement, which has the possibility of facilitating
trade among those parties.156
While joint elections may have some success in promoting bargaining
through framing, the benefit of using a joint election to try to split the
154 Policymakers may or may not have this as a goal. However, the objective of this
section is to point out that an election requiring joint decision-making has power to frame the
choice as cooperative, if that is a desired result. Of course, the use of cognitive heuristics
when designing laws likely affects behavior only "on the margins." Nevertheless, a similar
framing approach, whereby

altered custody standards that emphasize each parent's continuing importance to
the child[, . . .] appear to be useful in encouraging parents to actively participate

in their children's lives. Changed nomenclature - for example, some states now
use the term 'parenting plan' instead of 'custody and visitation' - may also work
to reduce the sense that there are custody 'winners' and 'losers' and thus to
promote parental cooperation.
Marsha Garrison, Promoting Cooperative Parenting: Programs and Prospects, 9 J. L. &
FAM. STUD. 265, 270 (2007).
155 As long as the default rule for the dependency exemption
remains as is,
distributional problems are unlikely to be created by more explicitly requiring joint action.
156 See generally Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1029 (1995); Benjamin
Alarie, Dividend Entitlements and Intermediate Default Rules, 9 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 135,
162 (2004).
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original endowment among the parties is likely modest at best. There are at
least two reasons for this. First, the entitlement could almost as easily be
split by giving unilateral power to one party while choosing a default rule
that favors the other party.15 7 Second, requiring multiple parties to
cooperate in the decision-making process may actually entrench the default
Similarly, the anchoring
rules, thereby exacerbating the status quo bias.
effect is unlikely to be affected by the use of a joint election rather than a
unilateral election. In fact, the anchoring effect may be intensified by a joint
election because, in order to change subsequent elections, multiple parties
(rather than just one party) must escape the influence of the original election
decision.
c.

Increasing Compliance & Minimizing Whipsaw

Joint elections also force all of the relevant taxpayers to make
affirmative commitments to consistent tax treatment, thereby increasing
compliance and minimizing whipsaw. As mentioned above, tax-minimizing
elections by taxpayers reduce revenue for the government. 159 Although the
provision of the election is tantamount to the government's implicit consent
to forego this revenue, the taxpayers should not be able to reduce their taxes
by an amount larger than the amount of revenue that the government
implicitly agreed to forego. Thus, it is important that the multiple taxpayers
affected by an election adopt consistent treatment in order to minimize the
risk of government whipsaw.
Inconsistent treatment presents a risk of whipsaw because elections that
160
For
benefit one taxpayer often adversely affect another taxpayer.
tax
to
the
respect
with
election
the
to
make
agree
example, if taxpayers
treatment of alimony, the recipient benefits because she no longer has to
include the alimony payments in her income, but the payor is adversely
affected because he can no longer take a deduction for the alimony
payments.161 Consistent treatment among the taxpayers minimizes the
157 See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.

See supra Part III.B.2.b.
See supra Part III.C.
Occasionally, an election may benefit all taxpayers affected by the election. See,
e.g., supra text accompanying note 82. In that case, the joint election may affect compliance
but does not play a role in preventing whipsaw. See also infra Part V.A (taking into account
the impact of whether taxpayers' systematically determinable individual preferences are
aligned or opposite).
As discussed above, the parties may still agree to make this election if the payee will
benefit so much from the election that she will be willing to compensate the payor for the
additional tax burden that he must bear as a result of the election.
159
160
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overall net revenue loss to the government because the tax revenue that the
government loses from the recipient may be at least partially offset by the
extra tax revenue that the government gains from the payor.
Thus, inconsistent treatment poses a risk that the recipient will exclude
the alimony payments from income, while at the same time, the payor takes
a deduction for the alimony payments. This inconsistent treatment would
reduce tax revenue in an amount greater than the reduction that the
government implicitly agreed to when providing the election, and this
reduction in tax revenue could be significant. The desire to increase the
likelihood of consistent treatment is one of the reasons that the rules
regarding the tax treatment of alimony were clarified to ensure that both
parties clearly and affirmatively agree about the treatment.16 2
A joint election can push all of the relevant parties to affirmatively
commit to a particular tax treatment. This affirmative act may help to
increase compliance, in part because people are generally more willing to
behave in a way that they affirmatively agree to behave,163 and in part
because taxpayers are less able to claim that they did not know about the
proper tax treatment or did not receive the notice that the electing party was
supposed to send.
This may be particularly useful when considering elections that are
currently unilateral (i.e., the regular section 338 election, the section 336(e)
election, and the section 83(b) election). In each of those contexts, the nonelecting party (U.S. sellers of stock in a foreign target corporation, the
target corporation, and the employer, respectively) is informed about the
election because the electing party (the buyer corporation, the seller
corporation, and the employee, respectively) is required to send the nonelecting party a copy of the election.164 However, switching to joint
elections that require all affected parties to consent to the election may help
increase the likelihood that all of the parties (not just the parties who are
currently empowered to make the relevant elections) report their tax
burdens in accordance with the election that is made.

62 See generally Hjorth, supra note
23 at 153-54.

163

See, e.g., Rona L. Levy, Relationship of an Overt Commitment to Task Compliance

in Behavior Therapy, 8 J. BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 25 passim (1977).
164 See supra notes 55, 65, 76; see also Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps:

The
Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REv. 695, 695 (2007) (explaining
how the involvement of third parties can provide a structural mechanism for increasing
taxpayer compliance).
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Reducing the Costs of Joint Elections

Despite the potential benefits conferred through the use of joint
elections, joint elections also create some potential problems, including the
possibility of increased transaction costs and the risk of opportunistic
behavior by taxpayers. Joint elections, however, may still be quite useful to
the extent that these disadvantages can be minimized, including by limiting
the scope of the joint choice.
a.

ControllingTransaction Costs

Although joint elections may help to reduce information costs,165
requiring more parties to participate in the decision-making process can
increase get-together, decision, and execution costs. As these transaction
costs increase, the strength of the argument for joint elections decreases.
For example, the proposed regulations currently provide that the
section 336(e) election is made unilaterally by the corporation disposing of
the target corporation stock. It may be particularly unwieldy to try to get
consent to a section 336(e) election from all of the individual purchasers or
distributees of the target corporation stock. The increased transaction costs
associated with involving a potentially very large number of additional
taxpayers in the election process could significantly increase costs, thereby
making things worse rather than better.
Nevertheless, these transaction costs could be reduced if, instead of
providing that the section 336(e) election would be made jointly by the
disposing corporation and all of the acquirers of target corporation stock,
the election would be made jointly by the disposing corporation and the
post-transaction target corporation. In that situation, the second party to the
election would be the target corporation, as it exists immediately after the
disposition.166 The target corporation would be represented in that choice
by its officers and/or board of directors. When deciding whether to consent
to the election, those individuals would have a fiduciary obligation to
protect the interests of the new shareholders.167 Moreover, the new
See supra Part IV.A. .a.
It is important that the second party to the election be the target corporation as it
exists immediately after the QSD. If the pre-QSD target corporation could be the second
party to the election, little would be gained because, at that time, the seller corporation (i.e.,
the first party to the election) would control the target corporation.
165

166

1
The seller corporation would have an incentive to negotiate about the election during
the rest of the acquisition negotiations, and the seller corporation might try to include a
covenant in the acquisition agreement that obligates the target corporation to consent to the
election after the QSD (or that obligates the acquirer(s) to cause, or use their best efforts to
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shareholders of the target corporation are generally not directly affected by
the election; rather, they are affected indirectly because the election affects
the target corporation's basis in its assets. Thus, a joint section 336(e)
election where the target corporation itself is the second party to the
election actually confers the power to choose on the taxpayer that is most
directly affected by the election, and that corporation can act to protect its
new shareholders.
The transaction costs could be further reduced by bifurcating the
election - requiring the joint choice only in those situations where the lessinformed party could be adversely affected by the choice, and otherwise
allowing the choice to be made unilaterally.168 For example, as discussed
above, a section 336(e) election often benefits the acquirers of the target
corporation stock because the target corporation often takes a stepped-up
basis in its assets. The risk posed to the acquirers of the target corporation
stock arises primarily where the election results in a stepped-down basis in
target corporation assets. Thus, the requirement of joint decision-making
could be limited to those section 336(e) elections that result in a step-down
in the target corporation's basis in its assets.
b.

Limiting OpportunisticBehavior

In addition to potentially increasing administrative costs, the use of
joint elections rather than unilateral elections also gives veto power to all of
the parties whose consent is needed. Taxpayers wishing to take advantage
of the situation can exercise this veto power opportunistically. As a result,
joint elections may empower taxpayers to extract hold-up payments, alter
the distribution of the tax benefit of the election, and increase the
importance of the default rule. By giving veto power to each party involved

cause, the post-transaction target corporation to consent to the election). In that case,
however, the joint election would still serve to protect the acquirers because they will be
represented in the overall negotiations.
168
Just as the power to make an election can be bifurcated (i.e., so that the election is
partly joint and partly unilateral), the default rule for an election can also be bifurcated (i.e.,
so that one default rule applies in certain situations, and another default rule applies in other
situations). As will be discussed later, bifurcation of the default rule often results in
significantly more transaction costs than bifurcation of the power allocation. See supra Part
IV.B.3. For example, with the section 336(e) election, bifurcating the default rule means that
the parties will likely need to go through the entire section 336(e) election analysis just to
determine how the transaction will be taxed in the absence of an election. In contrast,
bifurcation of the power allocation would allow the parties to proceed even without
considering the possibility of the election, knowing that the transaction will just be treated as
a stock disposition.
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in an election, the tax law would empower each party to hold up the
election process.
Thus, any party who is unaffected or minimally affected by the election
could extort the other party for additional compensation by threatening to
withhold consent. As a result of this risk, limiting the scope of the joint
choice can be an effective alternative. Specifically, the power allocation
can, again, be bifurcated, such that joint power is generally only provided to
parties who are materially affected by an election; in situations where a
party is likely to be indifferent to whether an election is made, that party
generally should not be entitled to participate in the choice. Thus, for
example, the regular section 338 election should only be a joint election
between the buyer corporation and the sellers of target stock to the extent
that the sellers are U.S. shareholders selling stock in a foreign target
corporation that is a CFC. In other circumstances, the sellers of target
corporation stock are generally not affected by a regular section 338
electionl69 and should not be empowered to veto an election desired by the
other parties.
Even where all parties to an election are affected by the election, the
veto power that a joint election gives to each party can have distributional
consequences. For example, if the section 83(b) election was joint instead
of unilateral, then the employer's veto power might enable the employer to
extract some of the value of the election from the employee, even if the
employer might otherwise be able to make itself indifferent to whether the
election is made. Similarly, the section 338(h)(10) election affects both the
buyer corporation and the seller corporation; the buyer corporation
generally benefits from the election as long as the target corporation's
assets have appreciated. However, the fact that the joint election empowers
the buyer corporation to veto an election that may be desired by the seller
corporation means that the buyer corporation can extract extra
compensation from the seller corporation (typically in the form of a
reduction in purchase price) in exchange for the buyer corporation's
consent. This effectively redistributes part of the tax benefit of the election

169 An exception to this is if the sellers have affirmatively agreed to indemnify the

buyer for pre-closing taxes of the target company, which would then include the tax
liabilities that arise as a result of the old target's deemed asset sale. See supra note 62 and
accompanying text. The adverse tax consequence would affect the sellers more as a result of
the negotiation regarding the indemnity rather than as a result of the election itself. Thus, the
sellers would not really need the election parameters to help protect themselves; rather, if the
adverse consequence arises because of negotiation, the sellers should also protect themselves
through that negotiation.
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from the seller to the buyer.170 Thus, where there is a policy reason to
encourage the parties affected by the election to share the value of the
benefit of the election (as with the election regarding the tax treatment of
alimony), a joint election may be useful to help achieve that distributional
goal.171 If, however, the potential tax benefit of the election should, from a
normative perspective, belong to one party and not to the other, then a joint
election could interfere with that distributional objective.
Moreover, empowering both parties affected by election to veto the
election increases the importance of the default rule because the joint choice
may create an additional impediment to the parties' abilities to opt into the
alternative treatment. This could cause default rules, which are already
sticky because of cognitive biases, to be even stickier. As a result, default
rules should also be selected with care.
B. Defining Default Rules
In the extensive literature about the design of default rules in contract
and corporate law,172 scholars often seek to determine what default rule will
best maximize efficiency or welfare, 173 typically arguing among a few basic
170 Two commentators have argued that this distribution
of the tax benefit of the

election is misallocated. See Seago & Barkhi, supra note 68.
One other way to accomplish this distributional objective is to make the election a
unilateral choice by the party that would be disadvantaged by the election. For example, the
election regarding the tax treatment of alimony could be designed as a unilateral election by
the payor. This would still likely result in a sharing of the tax benefit of the election because
the election would generally harm the payor (in that he would have fewer deductions) and
thus he would be disinclined to make the election unless the alimony recipient shared some
of the benefit with the payor. However, even though a unilateral election could achieve this
distributional goal, a unilateral election foregoes the framing and compliance benefits of
joint elections.
172 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIc STRUCTURE

OF CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991)

(discussing default rules in corporate law); Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87-91 (1989) (discussing default rules in contracts law); Richard
Craswell, ContractLaw, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising,88 MICH. L. REv.
489, 489-92 (1989); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargainingand the Economic Theory of
Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 615-18 (1990). This literature has also been
extended to a wide variety of additional areas of law, including employment law and child
custody.
173 See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 172, at 95 (discussing when "it may
be
efficient to choose a rule that a majority of people actually disfavor"); Sunstein, supra note
121, at 111, 128 (suggesting that it may be the case that "[w]hat really matters is welfare, not
efficiency; the latter is best understood as a crude proxy for the former" but recognizing that
it may be difficult to try to select default rules that best maximize welfare, given that "the
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alternatives. One approach to default rules is to employ a penalty default
rule - a default rule that is "purposefully set at what the parties would not
want" in order to "give at least one party. . . an incentive to contract around
the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision
they prefer,"'174 thereby inducing "valuable information revelation with low
transaction costs."1 75 An alternative approach is to use a preference-meeting
default rule - a default rule that reflects the terms for which the parties
would have negotiated if they had full information and if there were no
impediments to bargaining.176 Additionally, some scholars advocate for
some type of approach in the middle of those two methods.177
This debate can be helpful in analyzing how to set default rules for tax
elections. This is true both in the specific context of elections that are tax
bargaining focal points, where multiple private parties negotiate with each
other to reach an agreement about whether to contract out of the default rule
that would otherwise determine all of their tax consequences, and in
general, where tax elections can be conceived of "as the taxpayer's
opportunity to contract out of a default term in an implied agreement
between the taxpayer and the government."

legal system lacks direct access to welfare consequences, and . .. [in some settings,] normal
proxies are unreliable").
174 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 172, at 91.
I7 Id. at 128. Penalty default rules are a subset of "minoritarian" default rules, which
among other things, seek to protect certain parties from exploitation.
i7 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 172. There are a variety of
formulations of this concept, but they generally capture the same approach. See, e.g., Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. MinoritarianDefaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591,
1591 (1999) (calling "majoritarian" default rules those that set terms based "by simply
asking what most parties would have contracted for had they written a complete contract");
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of
ContractualObligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 (1983) (explaining this type of default rule
as one where "the preformulated rules supplied by the [government] should mimic the
agreements contracting parties would reach were they costlessly to bargain out each detail of
the transaction").
17 See, e.g., Alarie, supra note 156, at 161-62 (arguing for an "intermediate default
rule" in the context of insider trading). Another approach would be not to provide a default
rule at all, and instead require an "active choice" by the parties. This could also be conceived
of as a "double penalty default" - disfavoring all taxpayers by, for example denying any
parent the ability to take a dependency exemption, unless the parents cooperate and make an
affirmative choice as to the allocation of the exemption. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note
124, at 1189 (discussing the possibility of requiring an "active choice"). However, this
approach is likely to create significant transaction costs, compliance issues, and a perception
of unfairness.
178 Field, supra notel 1, at 67.
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Thus, the discussion in this subpart first endeavors to determine
whether, and in what circumstances, a penalty default, a preference-meeting
default, or an intermediate default will best enable multiple taxpayers to
bargain and exercise an election in a way that minimizes their aggregate tax
burden.179 Again, policymakers' abilities to design a default rule that
effectively facilitates bargaining and reduces transaction costs depend very
heavily on the determinability of taxpayers' individual preferences and of
the directionality of any informational asymmetry.
As the following will illustrate, sometimes it is difficult to design an
effective default rule, and sometimes the following analysis suggests
multiple possible conflicting default rules. Particularly for these situations,
this subpart also highlights some other, possibly competing, policy
considerations relevant to the choice of default rule, including complexity,
administrability, distributive concerns, and other social policy issues.
Furthermore, it may be difficult to select default rules that best balance the
possibly competing considerations, but this part explains the analysis and
tries to provide some guidance.
1. The Case for Penalty Default Rules
Penalty default rules are default rules that are unfavorable to at least
one party; this type of default rule gives the disfavored party "an incentive
to contract around the default rules and therefore to choose affirmatively the
contract provision [it] prefer[s]." 18 Effective penalty default rules require
the identification of the party that is most likely to have the relevant
information and the identification of the tax result that would be
unfavorable to that party.181 If both can be identified, then the tax result that
179 This analysis treats taxpayers' abilities to exercise an explicit election in a way that
reduces their aggregate tax burden as a crude proxy for welfare maximization, (a) at least as
between the multiple parties that are directly affected by the election, and (b) possibly in
general, to the extent that the government's provision of the explicit election opportunity for
good reason can be understood as a concession by the government that aggregate societal
welfare is maximized if, in these specific limited circumstances, the taxpayers are able to
cooperate to minimize their aggregate taxes. See also supra notes 81-84.
Iso Ayres & Gertner, supra note 172, at 91.
In the context of tax elections that affect the tax treatment of multiple taxpayers, a
penalty default rule also requires that the taxpayers can obtain an aggregate benefit from
negotiation. That is, the concept of a penalty default assumes that, as between the taxpayers
as a group and the government, the default rule generally favors the government and, in the
aggregate, disfavors the taxpayers. It is only in this situation where an election out of the
default rule would reduce tax revenue for the government and generate extra value for the
taxpayers as a group, such that there are gains available for the taxpayers if they bargain and
cooperate.
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is unfavorable to the informed party can be selected as the default rule. 182
As long as the less-informed party has some power over whether the
then the more-informed party, who needs the
election is made,
participation of the less-informed party in order to make the election, has an
economic incentive to inform the less-informed party about the opportunity
for joint tax minimization. Thus, penalty default rules can help overcome
the problem of asymmetric information, which can be a significant barrier
to effective bargaining.184 Where the value of the information revealed
exceeds the transaction costs involved in bargaining, the penalty default
rule can lead to an efficient result.185
Penalty default rules can be used to induce one taxpayer to reveal
valuable information to another taxpayer, or to induce the taxpayers as a
group to reveal valuable information to the government.186 For an example

182 A slight variation on the penalty default rule is as follows. Assume that the moreinformed party can be identified, but that it is difficult to determine the tax result that would
be unfavorable to that party. If the tax result that is favorable to the less-informed party can
be determined with reasonable certainty, then that tax result can be selected as the default
rule. Given the uncertainty of the more-informed party's individual tax preferences, the
selected default may or may not be desired by the more-informed party, depending on the
particular facts and circumstances. Nevertheless, this default rule largely accomplishes the
same information-forcing goals as the traditionally defined penalty default rule. In the
situations where the selected default rule is unfavorable to the more-informed party, the
default will operate like a traditional penalty default rule, incentivizing the more-informed
party to reveal information and contract around the default provision. In those situations
where the selected default rule is favorable to the more-informed party (i.e., where the
party's individual preferences are aligned), the default rule will operate like a preference
meeting default rule.
183 That is, the less-informed party either has unilateral power to make the election or
has joint power (with the more-informed party) to make the election. This is an important
way in which the two key election parameters discussed in this article are intertwined. See
supra Part W.A. Penalty default rules can generally achieve the benefits discussed in this
section only if the more-informed taxpayer (i.e., the one being "penalized" by the penalty
default) does not have unilateral power to opt out of the default rule without participation of
other taxpayer. The allocation of power to make elections is addressed above in Part IV.A.
For now, the remainder of this discussion about penalty default rules assume that the lessinformed taxpayer either has unilateral power or joint power (with the more-informed party)
to make the election.
184 See supra Part Ill.B.1.a.

1

Hirsch, supra note 122, at 1058.

186 Where two parties (taxpayer and the government) are affected by an election, there

are a limited number of permutations for default rules - either a default favors the taxpayers
and disfavors the government or vice versa. Where three parties (taxpayer 1, taxpayer 2, and
the government) are affected by an election, there are many more permutations: the default
could favor both taxpayers and disfavor the government, or vice versa; the default could
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of the former, 187 consider the tax treatment of alimony payments. The
taxpayers generally have clear, opposing individual preferences - the
payor would prefer to be able to deduct the payment of alimony from
income, and the recipient would prefer to be able to exclude from income
the receipt of the alimony payments.
Assuming that the party with more
income has more information about the law (or access thereto), the taxpayer
189
paying the alimony is more likely to be the better-informed party. Thus, a
penalty default rule for the tax treatment of alimony would provide that the
payor of alimony cannot deduct the amount paid, and the recipient of the
alimony can exclude the amount received from income. 190 While this rule
provides an individual benefit to the recipient of the alimony, this default
rule disfavors the party that is likely more informed - the payor of the
alimony - and also likely disfavors the taxpayers as a group.191
Consequently (and assuming that the recipient of the alimony has some
power over the choice), the payor of the alimony would have an economic
incentive to inform the recipient of the alimony of the opportunity to
minimize their aggregate taxes by opting for the alternate tax treatment.
favor taxpayer I and disfavor both taxpayer 2 and the government, or vice versa; and the
default could favor both taxpayer I and the government and disfavor taxpayer 2, or vice
versa. In this context, penalty defaults can be designed to push information in various
directions.
187 For an example of the latter - penalty defaults that incentivize the revelation of
valuable information from the taxpayers, as a group, to the government - consider two of
the corporate acquisition elections. As long as assets have appreciated in value, both buyers
and sellers generally favor dispositions of the stock of controlled corporate subsidiaries to be
treated as dispositions of the assets of those corporate subsidiaries (i.e., to have section
338(h)(10) and section 336(e) elections). Thus, a default rule that does not provide for
"deemed asset dispositions" treatment of these "actual stock dispositions" incentivizes the
taxpayers to provide sufficient information to the government to establish that the transaction
is eligible for the particular election (i.e., that the party disposing of the stock is, in fact,
disposing of stock constituting 80% vote and 80% value of the subsidiary). This information
may be valuable because it can help increase compliance and enable enforcement of the tax
rules regarding the treatment of these dispositions. In this way, the default rules of section
338(h)(10) and section 336(e) could be conceived of as a penalty default rule aimed at the
taxpayers, as a unit.
See supra Part II.A.I. This assumes that taxpayers generally prefer to reduce their
tax liabilities.
18 Generally, alimony payments flow from the ex-spouse with more income to the exspouse with less income.
190 This was the Code's original default treatment of alimony. See supra note 27.
Remember that this is not the current default treatment of alimony.
191 If the payor of the alimony is in a higher tax bracket than the recipient of the
alimony, then the ability of the payor to deduct the payment is worth more than the ability of
the recipient to exclude the payment.
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Because the alimony-recipient is made aware of this tax minimization
opportunity, she is in a position to bargain more effectively with her exspouse about their financial arrangement and protect herself from possible
opportunistic behavior. As part of the bargain, the alimony-payor would
likely be willing to compensate the alimony-recipient enough to make the
alimony-recipient willing to give up the tax benefit of the default rule (i.e.,
at least as much as the alimony-recipient will have to pay in taxes were she
to include the alimony in income).1 92
Of course, a default rule that favors a less-informed party does not
guarantee that the taxpayer will be able to bargain effectively or that the
taxpayers, as a unit, will reach the agreement that best minimizes their
aggregate tax burden. Taxpayers may make uneducated or ill-advised
decisions. Also, particularly in situations like divorce that involve a great
deal of emotion, there is a real risk that parties will fail to bargain even if
bargaining would result in their payment of less aggregate tax. 193
Moreover, default rules can be quite sticky, and thus, penalty default
rules can actually impede the taxpayers from reaching tax-minimizing
bargains. In particular, the status quo bias entrenches default rules because
of the preference that people have for the current state of the world over
alternatives. 194 Further, a penalty default rule that disfavors the moreinformed party and favors the less-informed party frames the question in a
way that effectively asks the less-informed party whether (and in exchange
for how much compensation) he or she is willing to "give up" a particular
tax treatment. When the question is framed in this way, taxpayers may feel
endowed with the initial entitlement conferred by the default rule and may
be averse to losing that particular tax treatment, although this bias may not
operate particularly strongly.
Even if the taxpayers can overcome these cognitive biases, penalty
default rules can be sticky because of increased transaction costs.
Specifically, as compared to a default rule that best minimizes the affected
taxpayers' aggregate tax cost, where very few sets of taxpayers will be
incentivized to negotiate, a penalty default rule, by definition, will cause
more sets of taxpayers to want to bargain around the default rule, thereby
increasing get-together costs. 19 5 Similarly, execution costs will increase
192

This approach would likely have helped Irene protect herself in the example

described in note 9, supra.
193 See Sunstein, supra note 121, at I 10 (noting that switching a default rule to favor an
irrational party might decrease overall welfare because of the irrational party's unwillingness
to trade).
194 See supra Part Ill.B.2.b.

195 See supra Part III.B. .b.
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because so many more sets of taxpayers will likely want to elect out of the
penalty default. Ultimately, "the stickier the penalty default, the more
ineffectual" it is likely to be.196 All of this suggests that penalty default
rules should be used with caution - only where the increased costs created
by penalty defaults, which can be sticky, are outweighed by the value of the
informational disclosure.
In addition, the potential information-forcing benefits of penalty
default rules depend on the ability of policymakers to design these rules
with reasonable certainty. This may be a challenging task for several
reasons, including because of the difficulty in predicting which taxpayer is
likely to have more information.197 As discussed above, it can be difficult to
generalize about whether a custodial parent or noncustodial parent is likely
to be better informed.198
Additionally, even if the taxpayer with more information can be
identified, it may be difficult to predict what default rule will disfavor such
party and incentivize that party to initiate information-revealing
bargaining.199 Although it is generally fair to assume that taxpayers wish to
reduce their tax burdens,200 sometimes the identification of the tax-reducing
alternative depends on the facts and circumstances of the situation - that
is, the individual preferences are not systematically determinable. For
example, consider a corporate parent disposing of the stock of a corporate
subsidiary in a transaction to which section 336(e) could apply; in this
situation, it is reasonably clear that the corporate parent disposing of the
subsidiary stock is likely to have more information than the acquirers of
that stock.201 However, whether stock disposition-treatment or assetdisposition treatment will better reduce the corporate parent's tax liability
depends, in large part, on how the parent's basis in the subsidiary's stock

196 See Hirsch, supranote 122, at 1060.

Note that there may be distributional reasons to choose a default
rule that favors a
weaker party, even if the choice of default rule may not reliably confer information-forcing
or negotiating-power benefits. See infra Part IV.B.4.
198 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
199 See Hirsch, supra note 122; see also
supra note 149.
200
There may be some situations where taxpayers will not act in this way. Due to sheer
irrationality or strategic behavior, one party may be willing to forego tax minimization in
order to prevent the other party from getting any benefit.
201 Specifically, the party disposing of the stock of the subsidiary is more likely to have
more information, than any individual acquirer of stock, about whether there is an integrated
plan for disposing of "control" of the corporate subsidiary. This is particularly true if there
are many acquirers who -acquire their stock in a series of separate transactions that occur
over time. See supra Part II.C.
197
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compares to the subsidiary's basis in its assets.202 If the former is much
higher than the latter, then the corporate parent is unlikely to want assetdisposition treatment. Conversely, if the latter is much higher than the
former, then the corporate parent is likely to want asset-disposition
treatment.203 So, a generally-applicable penalty default is difficult to design.
Ultimately, the more difficult it is to identify with reasonable certainty
which party is likely to be more informed, and the more difficult it is to
predict with reasonable certainty what the more informed party's
preferences are likely to be, the more difficult it is to establish a penalty
default regime, and the less effective any such attempt is likely to be. Plus,
given the significant limitations on potential benefits of penalty default
rules, penalty default rules should be used sparingly.
2.

The Case for Preference-Meeting Default Rules

Another approach to the selection of default rules is to choose a default
rule that reflects the terms that the parties would agree to if they had full
information and no transaction costs.204 In the context of tax bargaining
focal points, a preference-meeting default rule would be the option that best
minimizes the aggregate tax burden of the directly affected taxpayers.
This approach has several benefits. Preference-meeting defaults can
reduce transaction costs "because fewer elections need to be filed, which
makes the exercise of the tax choice simpler for the taxpayers and easier to
administer for the Service." 205 Further, a preference-meeting default rule
generally avoids most of the need for bargaining among taxpayers and
limits most of the adverse impact that cognitive biases and sheer
irrationality could have on the taxpayers' abilities to reach tax-minimizing
decisions. That is, with a default rule that reflects what the taxpayers would
select if they had full information and costless bargaining, there is a high
likelihood that the taxpayers will end up with the tax-minimizing result,
especially where the default rules are sticky.
As with the design of penalty default rules, designing effective
preference-meeting default rules requires that the individual preferences of
the taxpayers are reasonably determinable. Where the taxpayers'
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
203 This oversimplifies the analysis somewhat. It is not enough to compare inside and
outside basis. This is because the amount realized for the actual stock-disposition transaction
differs from the grossed-up amount realized deemed paid in the fictional asset-disposition
transaction for reasons including the presence of corporate liabilities. See supra note 75.
204 See supra note 176.
205 Field, supra note 11, at 67-68.
202
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preferences are quite difficult to predict, as with the section 83(b) election
in the employment context,206 it would be difficult to select a default rule
that reflects what bargaining taxpayers would prefer. Further, preferencemeeting default rules are most effective if the individual preferences of the
multiple taxpayers affected by the election are generally aligned. Where
taxpayers' determinable preferences are not aligned, then both taxpayers'
individual preferences cannot be met simultaneously; rather, the preferencemeeting default rule can, at best, reflect the alternative that reduces the net
tax burden of the group, but not as individuals.
Consider again the example of alimony. The individual preferences of
the payor and recipient are in direct opposition - the payor would like the
tax benefit of the alimony payment (i.e., a deduction), and so would the
recipient (i.e., an exclusion). Thus, their individual preferences cannot both
be met at the same time. Nevertheless, assuming again that the payor of the
alimony is in a higher tax bracket than the recipient of the alimony, the
parties' net preference would be met by allowing the payor to deduct the
alimony payment and by requiring the recipient to include the alimony
payment in income. Thus, a preference-meeting default rule would provide
that alimony is deductible to the payor and includable by the recipient exactly the default treatment of alimony under the current tax law.207 The
alimony recipient's systematic individual preference (to exclude the
payments from income) is not met, but the aggregate preference of the
taxpayers, as a group, is generally met. With the preference-meeting
approach to default rules, it matters very little if the parties are affected by
cognitive biases or if the parties' behaviors are driven strongly by emotion
rather than wealth maximization. These impediments to bargaining just
increase the likelihood that the tax treatment of the parties will be governed
by the default rule. And, with a preference-meeting default rule, that sticky
default rule will generally reflect the tax treatment that minimizes their
aggregate tax burden.
Note that preference-meeting approach to the default rule for alimony
is the opposite of the penalty default rule for alimony. Both can lead to taxminimizing results, leaving us with our original question about how to
choose the default rule. We will return to this shortly.
For now, it is enough to note that preference-meeting default rules,
where they can be designed effectively, can reduce transaction costs and
avoid many of the adverse consequences of cognitive biases. These benefits
may be significant, particularly in situations where penalty default rules are
206 See supra Part
II.B.
207 I.R.C. §§ 71(a), 215.
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unlikely to produce benefits in excess of costs. In particular, where there are
unlikely to be significant informational asymmetries (e.g., where the parties
are likely to be equally well informed),208 any information revealed because
of a penalty default is likely to be of little value, and thus a preferencemeeting default rule may be much more desirable.
3.

An Intermediate Bifurcated Approach? 209

It is also possible to consider explicitly bifurcating the default rule,
such that a penalty default rule would apply only in the situation(s) where
information forcing is likely to be particularly valuable with a high degree
of predictability, and such that a preference-meeting default rule would
apply in other circumstances.
This approach may be most useful where the identity of the moreinformed party and/or the individual preferences of the parties vary
depending on facts and circumstances that are easily predictable and
definable (i.e., the individual preferences are situationally determinable).210
Said differently, a bifurcated approach may be particularly useful if a
penalty default rule would lead to the revelation of valuable information in
208 For example, in a transaction in which a section 338(h)(10) election is to be
available, both the seller and the buyer are likely to have relatively equal information with
respect to the facts and the law. This is because the transaction generally involves a single
corporation selling at least 80% control of the target corporation to a single corporation
buying at least 80% control of the target corporation. With supermajority corporate owners
on both the sell-side and the buy-side of the transaction, both the buyer and the seller are
likely to have reasonably complete information about what transaction is occurring. Further,
since the primary buyer and primary seller are corporations, they are at least reasonably
likely to have counsel to advise them of the law.
209 Some scholars have advocated for the use of intermediate default rules, that fall
somewhere in between penalty default rules and preference-meeting default rules, in an
effort to split the entitlement, "unseat otherwise sticky default rules," and "cause each party
to be more willing and cognitively ready to strike an efficient bargain." Alarie, supra note
156, at 140-41.
210 For example, the intermediate bifurcated approach may not be particularly useful in
the tax treatment of alimony for two reasons. First, the individual preferences of the
taxpayers generally do not vary at all (i.e., the alimony payor wants to deduct the payment
and have the recipient include the payment in income, while the recipient wants to exclude
the payment from income and prevent the payor from deducting the payment). Second, the
identity of the likely more-informed party (i.e., the alimony payor) generally does not vary,
and to the extent that it does vary, it does not vary over a set of facts and circumstances that
are clearly definable ex ante. That is, it is possible for the alimony recipient to be more
informed, but it is unlikely, and it is difficult to describe with any certainty and predictability
the circumstances that would lead to the conclusion that the alimony recipient is the more
informed party.
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clearly definable limited circumstances, but not in other circumstances. For
example, consider again the corporate parent disposing of the stock of a
corporate subsidiary in a transaction to which section 336(e) could apply.
Neither a generally applicable penalty default rule nor a generally
applicable preference-meeting default rule is easy to design; in part, this is
because the parties' individual preferences (for stock disposition treatment
or asset disposition treatment) vary depending on the circumstances.
Moreover, neither approach is likely to be particularly effective across all
circumstances - a penalty default rule would likely be beneficial in the
limited situation where the less-informed party is at risk of being adversely
affected,211 but in other situations, a penalty default rule would likely create
significant additional transaction costs with very little information-forcing
benefit. Similarly, a preference-meeting default rule would likely be
beneficial in the limited situations where the parties' individual preferences
are generally aligned, but where their individual preferences are generally
not aligned, a "preference-meeting" default rule would do very little to
protect the less-informed party that is at risk of harm. Thus, a bifurcated
default rule could be partly a penalty default (i.e., providing that, where
deemed asset disposition treatment would result in the target corporation
taking a step-down basis in its assets,212 the default rule will tax the

211 Specifically, an information-forcing penalty default rule may be particularly useful
where asset disposition treatment would simultaneously be (1) advantageous to the corporate
parent disposing of the subsidiary stock, in that the corporate parent (i.e., the party with the
information as to whether there has been a QSD to which a section 336(e) election could
apply) would be able to recognize less gain or a larger loss, and (2) disadvantageous to the
acquirers (i.e., the parties more likely to be lacking information about whether there has been
a QSD), in that there would be a step-down in the target corporation's basis in its assets. A
default rule could be designed to impose a penalty solely that context.
212 This penalty default rule could be triggered upon either a step-down in the target
corporation's basis in its aggregate assets or a step-down in the target corporation's basis in
any of its assets. Under the latter approach, the penalty default rule could be triggered in the
vast majority of transactions, even if the inside basis adjustment results in a net benefit to the
target corporation and its new shareholder(s). This could be quite over-inclusive, which
could create significant additional transaction costs without providing much benefit to the
less-informed party. Thus, the former approach is preferable. Admittedly, if the penalty
default rule is triggered only upon a step-down in the target corporation's aggregate basis,
the basis in certain assets could increase while the basis in other assets could decrease. These
shifts might be beneficial or detrimental to the target corporation and its new shareholder(s),
depending on the depreciation schedules of these assets and on the timing of any future
dispositions of these assets. To the extent that these shifts might be detrimental, a penalty
default rule that is triggered only upon a step-down in the aggregate basis of the target
corporation's assets could be somewhat under-inclusive (i.e., this rule would not protect the
new shareholder(s) in all of the situations in which they could face risk of harm).
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transaction as a stock disposition), and partly a preference-meeting default
(i.e., providing that in other situations where there is a QSD, the transaction
will be taxed as a deemed asset disposition, absent taxpayer choice to the
contrary).
However, even if this might be effective for encouraging the flow of
information in the desired context, it could be quite complicated, thereby
increasing transaction costs. In particular, the whole section 336(e) analysis
would have to be undertaken just in order to determine the applicable
default rule, and that could be quite expensive. In contrast, it may create
fewer transaction costs to use the allocation of the power parameter to
encourage the flow of this information. 2 13
4.

Conclusion about Default Rules

The foregoing analysis provides guidance about how to select default
rules to facilitate tax-minimizing bargaining and to reduce bargaining costs.
It suggests that policymakers should use penalty default rules only when
they incentivize the revelation of valuable information without creating
significant additional costs. Otherwise the analysis suggests that default
rules should be selected so as to best reduce the aggregate tax burden of the
directly affected parties.
The foregoing analysis, however, provides less clarity than the analysis
of how to allocate the power to make choices about tax bargaining focal
points. Here, we are left with a number of open questions about the design
of default rules. How do we resolve the conflict if, like with the tax
treatment of alimony, there are good arguments for a penalty default rule
and for a preference-meeting default rule, and if those potential default rules
are contradictory? What if, like with the dependency exemption and the
section 83(b) election, the above analysis is indeterminate because the
difficulty in identifying the party with more information and the difficulty
in determining the parties' individual preferences impede policymakers'
abilities to design effective penalty default rules and or preference-meeting
default rules? And even if the above analysis is clear, might there be any
reasons not to use the default rule suggested by the above analysis?
These are not easy questions, but analyzing additional policy
considerations (separate and apart from facilitation of bargaining and
reduction of bargaining costs) may be helpful. Such considerations may
include simplicity, administrability, distributive concerns, and other social
policy objectives. The challenges,, of course, are how to prioritize these

213 See supra Part IV.A. I.a, Part IV.A.2.a; supra note 168; see also infra Part V.C.
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different considerations and how to weigh the policy benefits and
detriments of different possible default rules.
Further, the default rule for an election cannot be selected in isolation.
The choice of default rule must be coordinated with the way in which
power to make the election is allocated among the parties. As discussed
earlier, these two parameters are intertwined, and any recommendation
about the design of a tax bargaining focal point must harmonize both
parameters. Thus, in order for a penalty default rule to be effective, the lessinformed party (i.e., the party to whom the penalty default rule seeks to
disclose information) must have some power over the choice. Where it is
unclear how to design an information forcing penalty default rule because it
is unclear which party is likely to have the relevant information, a joint
election can be used instead to encourage the flow of information without
having to determine the identity of the more-informed party with reasonable
certainty. That is, it is important to determine whether tax bargaining can be
facilitated better by using one parameter rather than another or if it requires
a particular combination of the two parameters.
Admittedly, all of this balancing and coordination can be difficult, can
produce some uncertain results, and can lead to different results depending
on which objectives a policymaker views as most pressing and which
adverse consequences the policymaker considers to be most problematic.
Thus, the next part seeks to provide some general guidance about how to
coordinate the design of the different parameters and balance the potentially
competing considerations.
V. COORDINATING THE JOINT ELECTION PREFERENCE

& THE DEFAULT

RULE RECOMMENDATIONS

This part combines and coordinates the recommendations made in Part
IV.A (regarding the power to make the election) and Part IV.B (regarding
the choice of default rule), in an effort to provide generalizable
recommendations about the design of tax bargain facilitating elections in a
variety of cases. As part of this discussion, this part applies this article's
analysis to the examples discussed in Part II, making a few specific
recommendations for reform.
Given the foregoing analysis, tax bargain facilitating elections can be
divided up based on (a) whether, and in what circumstances, the individual
preferences (i.e., in the absence of any compensating payment or
opportunity for bargaining) of one or both of the parties can be clearly
determined, and (b) whether, and in what circumstances, the identity of the
less-informed party (if any) is reasonably determinable.
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With respect to the first question, taxpayers' individual preferences
may be systematically determinable (i.e. where an affected taxpayer will
virtually always prefer one particular tax treatment to another), largely
indeterminable (i.e., where the individual preferences vary based on the
relevant facts and circumstances, and where it is quite difficult to make any
generalizations, ex ante, about parties' individual preferences), or
situationally determinable (i.e., where individual preferences vary based on
the relevant facts and circumstances, but where there are clear
circumstances that are easily definable ex ante, in which the taxpayer will
strongly prefer one tax treatment over another). This part considers each
situation, taking into account the identifiability of any less-informed party.
A. Systematically DeterminableIndividualPreferencesDivorce Examples
1. Taxpayers' Individual Preferences Are Aligned
Where all affected parties have systematically determinable individual
preferences and where those individual preferences are aligned, it matters
very little whether the election is joint or unilateral, unless there are likely
to be information asymmetries between the taxpayers (in which case, the
more-informed party should not be entitled to make the election
unilaterally) or unless the joint framing produces a significant benefit (in
which case, the election should be joint). As to the default rule when the
parties' individual preferences are systematically determinable and aligned,
a preference-meeting default rule can minimize transaction costs because
such a default rule would reduce the individual tax burdens of both
taxpayers.214 In contrast, a penalty default rule that incentivizes the parties
to reveal information to the government (i.e., where the default disfavors
both taxpayers and favors the fisc) may be useful if the parties, in the
aggregate, possess information that would be particularly valuable if
revealed to the government.
2.

Taxpayers' Individual Preferences Are NOT Aligned

Of course, parties' systematically determinable individual preferences
are often not aligned. For example, as discussed above, the parties'
systematically determinable individual preferences are in conflict in both
the alimony context and in the context of the dependency exemption.
Moreover, as discussed above, both contexts likely involve informational
214

This actually may be a situation where the election should just be eliminated.
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asymmetries between the taxpayers. In some circumstances, as with
alimony, the directionality of the informational asymmetry is reasonably
clear. In other circumstances, as with the dependency exemption, the
directionality of the informational asymmetry is quite unclear.215
a. ClearDirectionalityofInformationalAsymmetry the Example ofAlimony
As discussed above in the context of alimony, where parties'
systematically determinable individual preference are in conflict and where
the directionality of the informational asymmetry between the taxpayers is
reasonably clear, both a penalty default rule and a preference-meeting
default rule are relatively easy to design, and both are likely to lead to the
tax treatment that best reduces the taxpayers' aggregate tax burden.
However, a penalty default rule for alimony (no deduction for payor and no
inclusion for recipient) and a preference-meeting default rule for alimony
(deduction for payor and inclusion for recipient) are in direct conflict. 2 16
Thus, the choice of default rule becomes more difficult.
In resolving this conflict, it is useful to note that the choice of default
rule alters the power dynamic among the taxpayers and can confer a
distributional benefit on one of the taxpayers. Thus, if policymakers can
identify a distributional reason to favor one taxpayer affected by an election
over another taxpayer affected by an election, they can try to select a default
rule that best serves the economic interests of that favored party. A default
rule that favors one party generally means either that party will get the
favorable treatment conferred by the default rule,217 or that party will be in
215 It is also possible to have an election where the parties have systematically
determinable, but opposite, individual preferences, and where it is relatively clear that there
is little or no informational asymmetry. In such a case, a default rule that meets the net
preferences of the parties can minimize transaction costs because the taxpayers would be
unlikely to want to opt out of the default. But, if there is a distributional or other social
policy reason to favor one party over another, the default can be chosen to favor that party.
Also, if the parties, in the aggregate, possess information that would be particularly valuable
if revealed to the government, a penalty default rule (i.e., where the default rule provides for
the opposite of the parties' net preference) could incentivize the parties to reveal information
to the government in order to opt for the tax minimizing alternative.
216
See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text (discussing a penalty default rule);
supra text accompanying note 207 (discussing a preference-meeting default rule).
217 It is possible that the party that is intended to be favored by the choice
of default rule
may not be better off with that default rule than the party was with the opposite default rule.
This is, in part, because the benefits that policymakers try to confer on the favored party can
be priced into the underlying private bargain. See Sunstein, supra note 121, at 111
(suggesting that the effect of flipping a default rule might be "modest" if the existing default
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a position of power in negotiations, meaning that the party will be able to
demand compensation in order to accept less favorable treatment.218 So, in
the context of alimony, if policymakers believe that prospective alimony
payors, by virtue of their high income and sophistication, have an unfair
bargaining advantage over prospective alimony recipients,219 policymakers
may lean toward using the penalty default, rather than the preferencemeeting default, for the tax treatment of alimony. The penalty default,
which would treat alimony as excludable for the recipient and nondeductible by the payor, confers the favorable tax treatment on the
recipient, thereby helping to level the bargaining playing field between the
stronger, more-informed party and the more vulnerable, less-informed
party. Further, given that cognitive biases can make default rules "sticky," a
default rule that favors the alimony recipient is quite likely to help the
recipient protect herself from opportunistic behavior of the alimony payor.
Together, these considerations may argue that, on balance, a penalty default
rule should be used for the tax treatment of alimony - the reverse of the
current default rule.
In addition, policymakers must consider how effectively a chosen
default rule will accomplish the particular policy objective. For example, in
the context of alimony, there is a risk that the penalty default rule may be so
sticky that the parties may not be able to overcome the animosity and
emotion that serve as barriers to bargaining. In that case, the parties will be
unable to cooperate to minimize their tax burden, and the penalty default
rule would be unlikely to yield the desired information-forcing benefits.
Further, even if the parties can contract around a sticky penalty default rule,
an alimony recipient may not receive the distributional advantage that
policymakers hope to grant by using a penalty default rule. This is because,
among other reasons, the alimony payor may fight to reduce the amount of
the alimony in light of the flipped tax default rule. That is, he may price the
impact of the tax rules into the amount of alimony he is willing to pay,
thereby shifting some or all of the incidence of the intended distributional
benefit over to him and away from her. Thus, these concerns may weaken
slightly the argument for flipping the current default rule for alimony. 2 20

rule and any change thereto would be priced into the underlying deal).
218 Again, this discussion continues to assume that the party favored by the default rule
will have some power to decide whether there will be an election out of the default rule.
219 This assumes that policymakers believe such a distributional shift would be
desirable, although many policymakers may not agree.
220 Another concern is that such a change is likely to create significant transition
issues,
particularly with respect to alimony agreements already in place. For example, switching the
default rule may result in windfalls for the payees, particularly where the existing default
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Assuming a penalty default rule for the tax treatment of alimony is, on
balance, desirable, the less-informed party (i.e., the alimony recipient) must
retain some power over the election in order for the penalty default rule to
be effective. This can be accomplished either by giving the less-informed
party the unilateral power to make the election or by providing that the
election must be made jointly by both parties. While a unilateral election
may reduce execution costs slightly, a joint election creates greater benefits.
Specifically, as noted above, a joint election takes advantage of the framing
heuristic, in that a joint choice presents the decision as collaborative, which
may help encourage the parties to work together even in the face of great
emotion or animus. Moreover, compliance can be increased, disputes
reduced, and whipsaw minimized if the taxpayers involved, who generally
have opposing individual preferences, both affirmatively agree to a
particular joint tax treatment. This suggests that the allocation of power for
the alimony election should remain as is -joint.
b.

UnclearDirectionalityofInformationalAsymmetry
the Example of the Dependency Exemption

-

The analysis will differ if the directionality of the informational
asymmetry is unclear. Even where the parties have systematically
determinable individual preferences, it may be difficult to design either a
penalty default rule or a preference-meeting default rule without knowing
which party is likely to be less-informed. Where the default rule analysis is
indeterminate, policymakers may have to select a default rule based on
distributional considerations and other tax norms. However, regardless of
the default rule ultimately chosen, any election out of the default rule
should be made jointly, as involving both parties in the election process
increases the likelihood that the more-informed party (whoever that may be)
will reveal relevant information to the less-informed party in order to obtain
the latter's participation in the election.
For an example, consider the allocation of the dependency exemption
among divorced parents of a dependent child. As discussed earlier, although
the parties have systematically determinable individual preferences (each
prefers to have the dependency exemption), it may be hard to generalize
about which parent is less-informed. Recall that this is because it is difficult
to generalize about whether the custodial parent has custody (a) because she
is the primary caregiver while her ex-husband is the primary breadwinner or
rule is already effectively priced into the original agreement. Nevertheless, these issues could
be mitigated with a transition rule that provides that the new default rule only applies to
alimony agreements established or significantly modified after the enactment of the change.
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(b) because the noncustodial parent is simply unavailable.221
As a result, the penalty default/preference-meeting default analysis is
indeterminate. Assume, for a moment, that the noncustodial parent is the
primary breadwinner,222 the default rule analysis here would mirror the
default rule analysis for the treatment of alimony payments. That is, the
noncustodial parent would be likely to have greater income and greater
information, and by selecting a default rule that is unfavorable to that parent
(i.e., allocation of the dependency exemption to the custodial parent), the
rule can encourage the noncustodial parent to share information with the
custodial parent about the opportunity to reduce their aggregate tax burden
through cooperation. Further, this approach might confer a distributional
and power-dynamic benefit on the custodial parent, possibly giving her
additional leverage to share in the value of the exemption.
There are two key problems with the foregoing. First, the assumption
about the noncustodial parent might be wrong in a particular case. The
noncustodial parent may be a "deadbeat," so he might have little
information to share, little to gain through negotiating about the allocation
of the exemption, and a low likelihood that he would even be able to
overcome the get-together costs of negotiating. Second, even if the
assumption about the noncustodial parent breadwinner is accurate, the
dependency exemption phases out at high income levels, so it will not
necessarily be the case that the noncustodial parent, even if he had
information about the law, would have any monetary benefit to gain from
negotiation. Thus, the penalty default approach would not work in these
situations. Similarly, a preference-meeting default rule approach would be
equally unsuccessful because it is unclear ex ante what the net preferences
of the parties would be. That is, even if policymakers wanted to allocate the
dependency exemption to the party for whom it would be most valuable
(i.e., the allocation to which the parties would agree if there were no
impediments to bargaining), it is not clear whether this is likely to be the
custodial or noncustodial parent.
Given that the penalty default/preference-meeting default rule analysis
is indeterminate for the dependency exemption, policymakers should be
guided by distributional considerations and other tax norms. So, for
example, a default rule that favors the custodial parent advances a social
policy goal of the dependency exemption - to adjust tax burdens to help
221 Recall that it was also unclear how the dependency exemption should generally be
allocated to reduce the aggregate tax burden of the parents. See supra Part II.A.2.
222 This analysis could just have easily started with the opposite assumption and then
walked through the default rule analysis on that assumption, ultimately leading to the same
recommendations.
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parents who are supporting children.223 Allocation of the dependency
exemption to the parent with custody of the children directs the tax benefit
to the household in which the children primarily reside, thereby hopefully
conferring a distributional benefit on these households. Moreover, by
choosing a default rule that favors the custodial parent, the tax law
empowers the custodial parent224 to have another tool to help enforce the
noncustodial parent's child support obligations.225 Thus, this supports the
current default rule for the dependency exemption - it should be allocated
to the custodial parent unless there is an election otherwise.
As to the allocation of power, in order for the default rule for the
allocation of the dependency exemption to have the above-intended
distributional impact, the custodial parent must have some power over the
choice. However, a unilateral choice by the custodial parent would forego
the possibility of information-forcing from the custodial parent to the
noncustodial parent, which could be valuable if the noncustodial parent was
the less-informed party. Thus, given the lack of clarity about which parent
is likely to be more informed, both parents should have power over the
choice. Currently, the custodial power has unilateral power to release the
exemption, but the election actually requires joint action because the
noncustodial parent must attach the release form to his tax return. That is,
the dependency exemption election requires joint action but not joint
decision-making. This could be tweaked slightly to frame the choice more
as a cooperative, joint decision by both the custodial and noncustodial
parent.
B. Largely Indeterminable IndividualPreferencesThe Employment Example
In contrast to elections where the taxpayers' individual preferences are
systematically determinable, there may be situations where it is difficult to
say much at all about the taxpayers' individual preferences. Where
individual preferences vary based on individual facts and circumstances that
are difficult to define ex ante, designing a preference-meeting default rule
would be extremely difficult (if even possible). Consider, for example, the
223 See generally BORIS 1.BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS
21.01 (3d ed. 2010).
224 Cf Weitzman, supra note 91, at 395-406 (discussing concerns about "bargaining
leverage, economic vulnerability and lack of information" for divorcing women).
225 See, e.g., Maples, supra note 103, at 28. Note that this analysis
points toward the
same result as the penalty default analysis does, at least under the assumption that the
noncustodial parent is the primary breadwinner.

Virginia Tax Review

68

[Vol. 31:1

employment context and the section 83(b) election. When an employer
transfers restricted property in compensation for services, it is not clear
whether the employee would rather have current or deferred compensation,
whether the employer would rather have a current or deferred compensation
deduction, and which choice would minimize the employee's and
employer's aggregate tax burden (particularly if their individual preferences
are not aligned). Thus, it is difficult to generalize about what default
treatment would best meet either or both parties' individual preferences. 226
Similarly, without knowing the taxpayers' individual preferences, it
would be quite difficult to design a penalty default rule, even if the
directionality of the information asymmetry is clear. 227 And, where the

directionality of the information asymmetry is unclear, the penalty default
approach is basically futile. For example, with the section 83(b) election,
the direction of the desired information flow is not clear because the
employer, as a repeat player in issuances of restricted property for services,
may have more information about the law, but the employee may have
more information about the facts (particularly if the vesting of the property
depends on the employee continuing to stay with the employer for a certain
period of time). Thus, query which party policymakers would try to
"penalize" through a penalty default rule.
Thus, the indeterminacy of the penalty default/preference-meeting
default analysis leaves policymakers reliant upon general tax norms and
distributional objectives when designing the parameters for these elections.
For example, one issue that is common to both the employee and employer
in section 83(b) situation is that both face a valuation problem. It is often
difficult to value accurately property that is nontransferable and subject to
current
the
complicates
problem
valuation
This
forfeiture.
inclusion/deduction tax treatment for both parties; in contrast, when the
property becomes transferable or nonforfeitable, it can be easier to value. 228
Thus, a default rule providing that the income and deduction events are to
be deferred until that later time (i.e., the current default rule)229 can advance

Note that this difficulty is supported by data that suggests that there is a wide
divergence in behavior among employers as to whether they want the section 83(b) election
to be made, whether they want it not to be made, or whether they do not have a strong
preference. See Blouin & Carter, supra note 51.
227 In this case, it is at least possible to conclude that, regardless of the default rule, the
less-informed party should have some power over the election.
228 For example, if the property is transferable, it can be sold to a third party, and that
arms-length sale provides very good evidence of the property's value.
229 I.R.C. § 83(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6 (2003).
226
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simplicity.230 Moreover, under this default rule, if one of the parties
believes that it can value the property and believes that it would be valuable
to accelerate the tax event, this default rule encourages the informed party
(whoever that may be) to communicate that information to the other party,
thereby revealing information about its private valuation and financial/tax
status. 231
As to the allocation of the power to make the election, where the
taxpayers' individual preferences are largely indeterminable and where the
directionality (or even existence) of informational asymmetries are unclear,
the analysis of the how the election power should be allocated may also be
relatively unclear; as a result, distributional concerns may again play a
significant role in the analysis. For example, in the context of the section
83(b) election, a joint election would have framing and compliance benefits,
but the information forcing and self-protection benefits of a joint choice are
minimal. This is because employers usually have ample information, at
least about the law, because they are often repeat players, and because
employers are generally in a good position to protect themselves through
bargaining or otherwise. Moreover, statutorily mandating that employers
have some power over the decision-making process could shift some of the
benefit of the election to the employer, and that may not be a desirable
distributional consequence. As a result, there is a relatively weak argument
for revising the unilateral employee election to make it a joint election
shared by the employee and the employer, but the allocation of power for
section 83(b) elections presents a very close call.
C. SituationallyDeterminableIndividualPreferencesCorporateAcquisition Election Examples
In some contexts, individual taxpayer preferences may vary depending
on the facts and circumstances, but unlike the contexts where such
preferences are largely indeterminable, the variations in individual taxpayer
preferences that occur are relatively predictable, ex ante, at least in certain
situations. As a result, the analysis of the parameters for these elections can
be divided and evaluated situation-by-situation, based on the foregoing
recommendations. That is, where individual taxpayer preferences vary in
ways that are relatively predictable, ex ante, the power allocation and/or
default rule may be bifurcated in order to get information forcing benefits in
230

Further, such a rule may be easier for the Service to administer assuming that
valuation is easier when the property becomes transferable or nonforfeitable.
231 See supra Part IIB.l.a (discussing informational asymmetry about private valuation
as an impediment to bargaining).
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the limited situations where the information has high value, while otherwise
avoiding the additional transaction costs that the information forcing
approaches can create.
For example, consider the corporate acquisition elections. As discussed
earlier, there is likely to be asymmetric information in some situations and
not others, and the taxpayers' individual preferences will also vary based on
the facts and circumstances; in some situations, taxpayers may even be
indifferent to how the transaction is treated for tax purposes. Those
situations where there is likely to be asymmetric information and where the
less-informed party could be adversely affected as a result can be identified
and then analyzed separately.
Recall that there is most likely to be asymmetric information in the
situations where a single corporate parent either acquires (in the case of a
regular section 338 election) or disposes of (in the case of a section 336(e)
election) more than 80% of the vote and value of the stock of a corporate
subsidiary from/to multiple different individuals in separate transactions
over a twelve month period. In those situations, the corporate parent
possesses information about the overall acquisition/disposition plan that the
sellers/buyers may not have. To the extent that deemed asset-disposition
treatment rather than actual stock disposition treatment is likely to
adversely affect the less-informed parties, there is likely to be significant
value in selecting election parameters that incentivize the more-informed
party to disclose information to those less-informed parties. As discussed
herein, both default rules and power allocation rules can incentivize the
revelation of information. So, the question is how either or both of those
parameters can be tailored to apply to the particular situations where
information disclosure is likely to be valuable while still minimizing costs.
One alternative is to bifurcate the default rule - consider imposing a
penalty default rule tailored to the situations where a less-informed party
has a relatively determinable individual preference and could be adversely
affected by the tax treatment, and imposing a preference-meeting default
rule (if determinable) in the remainder of the situations.232 For the
dispositions of corporate subsidiaries to which section 336(e) elections are
available, this would mean using the following default rules: the transaction
is treated as a stock disposition if deemed asset disposition treatment would
cause the target corporation to take a step-down in the basis of its assets
(i.e., the tailored penalty default),233 and otherwise, the transaction is
232 See supra Part IV.B.3.

233 This assumes that the target corporation has some power over whether the election is
made.
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treated as a deemed asset-disposition (i.e., the residual preference-meeting
default). 234
Another alternative is to limit the scope of the joint election (i.e.,
bifurcating the power allocation) - require Joint decision-making when
information disclosure is likely to be valuable, and allow unilateral
decision-making in the remainder of the situations.235 For dispositions of
corporate subsidiaries to which section 336(e) elections are available, this
would mean allocating power to choose as follows: joint election between
the corporation disposing of the subsidiary stock and the post-transaction
target corporation, if asset disposition treatment would cause the target
corporation to take a step-down in the basis of its assets (i.e., where the
acquirers could be harmed if they lack knowledge about the overall
transaction);236 and otherwise, the corporation disposing of the subsidiary
stock could make a unilateral election about whether the transaction is
treated as a deemed asset disposition or an actual stock disposition. Note
that, when requiring joint action, the target corporation itself, as opposed to
the possibly numerous individual acquirers of target stock, is the second
party whose consent is required to make the election; this significantly
reduces the potential transaction costs of a joint election while still
preserving the information forcing benefits. 237
Of course, these alternatives must be harmonized in a way that
facilitates information disclosure and bargaining while minimizing the
overall transaction costs. In this situation,238 it is more cost-effective to
bifurcate the power allocation rules rather than the default rules. This is
because the bifurcated default rule approach requires that the parties
undertake the entire asset disposition versus stock disposition analysis
merely to determine the transaction's tax treatment if the parties fail to act.
That seems quite complex and potentially costly for both the taxpayers and
the Service. In contrast, with a bifurcated power allocation (and uniform
default rule), it is perfectly clear what the tax consequences of a transaction
are if the parties fail to act; it is only if one or more of the parties thinks that
234 See supra Part IV.B.3.
235

See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
236 You might wonder, why not use a unilateral election in this context, and merely
allocate that unilateral right to the less-informed party. That is certainly a possibility, but that
approach forgoes the compliance benefit of joint elections. Further, when bifurcating the
power to make the choice, simplicity may be enhanced if the corporation disposing of the
subsidiary stock is treated more uniformly (i.e., where that party will always be involved in
any election, regardless of whether the target corporation also has some power).
237 See supra Part IV.A.2.a.
238 Harmonization may produce different results in different
circumstances.
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an alternative treatment might be preferable, that they must undertake the
asset disposition versus stock disposition analysis to determine whether the
election can be made unilaterally or jointly.
Of course, this bifurcated power allocation approach, which is contrary
to the proposed regulations, requires a uniform default rule that is likely to
be disadvantageous to the informed party (i.e., the corporate parent
disposing of the subsidiary stock) in the situation where the information
revelation is likely to be valuable (i.e., where the transaction target
corporation could suffer a step down in the basis of its assets without even
knowing that there might be an opportunity to negotiate to avoid that
result). This suggests that, when bifurcating the allocation of power, the
default rule should treat these corporate dispositions as stock dispositions,
unless an election is made.
An additional benefit to this default rule is that the default rule follows
the form of the transaction. This generally enhances administrability for the
Service because this default rule promotes continuity within the tax
treatment of stock dispositions. 2 39 Further, this default rule, which is often
undesirable for the parties in the aggregate, can incentivize the taxpayers to
inform the government about the details of the transaction in order to obtain
the more desirable tax treatment, thereby aiding the government's
enforcement powers.240
What about the other corporate acquisition elections? Of course, a
separate analysis needs to be done for each. Rather than belabor the details
of that analysis here, I want to focus on two insights arise from that
analysis.
First, joint power to elect is most important where there are significant
informational asymmetries and the less-informed party can better protect
itself from harm if that information is disclosed. Thus, this suggests that the
regular section 338 election, which is currently wholly unilateral, should be
joint in very limited circumstances where the less-informed party could be
adversely affected.241 This also implies that, in situations where one party is
indifferent to the tax treatment of the transaction (e.g., in the remaining
transactions where a regular section 338 election is available), that party
should not be entitled to participate in the election; rather, in those
situations, the party affected by the election should have unilateral power to
239 That is, there is not a huge difference in the tax treatment of the acquisition of 79.9%
of the stock of a corporate subsidiary and the tax treatment of the acquisition of 80.1% of the
stock of a corporate subsidiary.
240 See supra note 187.
241 A regular section 338 election should be made jointly in the case of a

foreign target corporation that is a CFC. See supra Part IV.A.2.b.
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elect.242 Further, this also suggests that the section 338(h)(10) election need
not remain a joint choice. This is because the impediments to bargaining are
quite low for section 338(h)(10) transactions and because there is little
valuable information to be gained from information sharing among the
taxpayers. Nevertheless, on balance, it is reasonable to leave the section
338(h)(10) election as a joint election because parties on both sides of the
transaction are generally affected by the choice, because the joint election
frames the decision as cooperative, and because the joint election helps to
ensure consistent tax treatment by all parties to the transaction.
Second, the similarities among the three elections suggest that, for
simplicity and administrability reasons, there should be some coordination
among the elections. This is particularly true with respect to the default
rules. "Stock disposition" treatment is likely the better default rule for
section 336(e) and regular section 338 contexts. Although there is a
reasonably good argument that "asset disposition" treatment is the better
(more preference-meeting, and transaction cost-reducing) default rule for
the section 338(h)(10) context, 243 administrability and predictability of the
law is enhanced if all three elections employ the same default - stock
disposition treatment. Since the impediments to bargaining are quite low in
the section 338(h)(10) context, 244 it seems relatively unproblematic to use a
default rule that the parties are likely to want to contract around.
Ultimately, this analysis suggests that the parameters of the corporate
acquisition elections should remain unchanged, with two exceptions: in the
limited circumstances described herein, both the section 336(e) election and
the regular section 338 election should be made jointly rather than
unilaterally.
VI. CONCLUSION

In addition to making a few specific recommendations about how to
revise certain tax elections, one goal of this article is to highlight the
possibility (and, in the case of explicit elections that affect multiple
taxpayers, the probability) that taxpayers will privately negotiate among

242 Thus, just those shareholders that are currently entitled to notice about the regular
section 338 election should be empowered to have a role in the decision about whether to
make the election. See supra note 65.
243 This default rule generally meets the likely preferences of the parties, and there is
unlikely to be asymmetric information in this context where a penalty default would be
valuable.
244
There are profit-maximizing businesspeople, both sides likely have full information,
and the parties are already in negotiations.
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themselves against the backdrop of the tax law in order to best minimize
their aggregate taxes. Whether or not this tax planning is desirable, it is
important to appreciate that the design of the tax law can focus taxpayers'
attention on specific issues for negotiation and can greatly influence the
parameters for this bargaining. Thus, this article makes recommendations
about how the tax law can be constructed to emphasize or deemphasize
issues for cooperative tax planning and can be designed to impede or
facilitate this private negotiation. Hopefully, policymakers will take account
of this power when designing explicit tax elections and other tax provisions.

